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This paper reviews the evolution and current state of subnational taxation in five large 
emerging countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Nigeria – BRIC plus one.  As these 
case studies show, intergovernmental fiscal relations in any country are inevitably both 
path-dependent and context-sensitive.  In India and Brazil, for example, subnational 
governments already have a significant degree of fiscal autonomy in terms of being able 
to set some key tax rates.  In both countries, however, substantial attention still must be 
paid to improving the general consumption taxes that are the main source of regional 
government revenues as well as the property taxes on which local governments mainly 
depend.  Although Nigeria, like India and Brazil, is a federation, its fiscal system depends 
so heavily on oil revenues that almost all political attention has been focused on securing 
a bigger share of these revenues. Both China and Russia have made a number of 
important changes in the direction of centralizing rather than decentralizing effective 
control over subnational taxes.  In both countries the key issue is the extent to which 
fiscal decentralization is to be accompanied by any significant political decentralization.  
At the present time, in neither China nor Russia is it clear that the central authorities are 
willing to permit subnational governments much autonomy in this respect.    
 
 
Keywords: state and local taxation, intergovernmental fiscal relations, Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, Nigeria 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper looks at how subnational taxation actually works in five large 
emerging countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Nigeria.  To place this discussion 
in broader context, consider first the broad differences in taxing patterns observable 
between the seven large emerging countries -- including China, India and Russia but not 
the others studied here -- and the six developed federal countries included in Table 1. On 
average, central governments are slightly more important in the large emerging country 
group as taxers (71.6%) than in the developed federations group (69.8%).  Central 
governments in large emerging countries also receive a slightly greater share of income 
taxes (62.6% compared to 60.4% for the developed federal countries) as well as 
considerably higher shares of consumption taxes (72.8% compared to 59.4%) and 
especially taxes on property (24.4% compared to 7.4%).  India, Indonesia, and South 
Africa collect 100% of income taxes centrally, for example; among developed federal 
countries, only Australia does.  In all the developed federal countries except Switzerland 
most or all taxes on property are collected by subnational (and usually local) 
governments.  However, only in China, Russia, and Ukraine does the central government 
collect less than 10% of such taxes in the large emerging countries included in the table.   
 
Such averages may provide interesting talking points.  However, on the whole 
they probably conceal more than they reveal.  Indeed, in the end perhaps the most 
important lesson to take from Table 1 is simply the wide variation in the allocation of tax 
bases by level of government that may be found in different countries around the world.  
The main lesson such data suggests is simply that countries have a wide range of choice 
when it comes to subnational taxation.    
 
Table 1 also serves to illustrate why it is surprisingly difficult to make definitive 
statements about the nature and importance of subnational taxation in particular 
countries.  Consider, for example, the summary information shown in Table 2 with 
respect to the extent of subnational revenue ‗autonomy‘ (as measured by the extent to 
which regional and local expenditures are financed with ‗own source‘ revenues) in a 
number of large countries, including four (China, Russia, India and Brazil) that are 
discussed in more detail later in the present paper.  
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Table 1 
Share of Central and Subnational Taxes, Selected Countries and Years 
(percent) 
 
Country and year 
Total tax revenues Taxes on income Taxes on property 
Domestic taxes on 
goods and services 
%Central %State %Local %Central %State %Local %Central %State %Local %Central %State %Local 
*Germany 1998 70.7 22.0 7.3 43.4 36.6 20.0 0.8 48.6 50.6 62.8 37.0 0.2 
*Spain 1997 83.0 7.5 9.4 85.7 8.7 5.7 2.8 52.4 44.7 78.5 5.4 16.0 
Ukraine 2001 74.3 0.0 25.7 35.6 0.0 64.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.5 0.0 19.5 
*Canada 1999 52.5 38.5 9.0 63.5 36.5 0.0 0.0 21.1 78.9 41.0 59.0 0.1 
*Russia 2001 69.7 0.0 30.3 27.6 0.0 72.4 5.2 0.0 94.8 82.7 0.0 17.3 
*South Africa 1998 92.8 0.5 6.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 21.7 0.0 78.3 98.6 1.4 0.0 
*Switzerland 2000 66.0 20.0 14.0 30.3 39.1 30.7 30.9 42.8 26.3 92.2 7.6 0.2 
*Australia 1999 77.4 19.3 3.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.6 36.3 66.2 33.8 0.0 
*United States 2001 69.3 19.1 11.6 83.0 15.5 1.5 10.0 8.0 82.0 15.7 67.6 16.8 
*Argentina 2001 59.7 40.3 0.0 50.5 49.5 0.0 54.4 45.6 0.0 94.6 5.4 0.0 
*India 1999 62.6 37.4 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 14.9 85.1 0.0 41.5 58.5 0.0 
China 1999 45.0 55.0 0.0 24.4 75.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 55.7 44.3 0.0 
Indonesia 1999 97.1 2.9 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 74.9 25.1  0.0 95.9 4.1 0.0 
 
Source: As calculated from International Monetary Fund (2002) by Martinez-Vazquez, McLure, and Vaillancourt (2006). Countries 
are listed in order of tax-to-GDP ratio (from various sources and usually for a later year than the detailed tax data included in this 
table). The countries discussed in more detail later in this paper are shown in bold, other large emerging countries are shown in italics, 
and federal countries are indicated by an asterisk. 




Fiscal ‘Autonomy’ in Some Large Countries 
(various years) 
 
Country Main Subnational Taxes SubnationalOwn Source 
Revenues as % Total  
Subnational Revenue 
Brazil Sales, Property 75%  
China No true subnational taxes <5% 
India Sales, Property 38% State, 25% Local 
Indonesia Vehicles, Fuel Surcharge, Income Tax 22% Province  (N. 
Sulawesi) 
6-9% Local  




US Income, sales, property taxes 66% State, 55% Local 
 
Source: Based on information presented in Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace (2008), pp. 
214-15. Note that the information for Russia relates to 2002; as noted in the text subnational tax 
revenue structure changed radically in Russia several times during the last decade. 
 
 
The relatively high importance of subnational revenues in China shown in Table 1 
contrasts with the low degree of ‗autonomy‘ reported in Table 2. Similarly, the relatively 
high ‗autonomy‘ of local governments in India reported in Table 2 is hard to relate to the 
extremely low importance of local taxes shown in Table 1, and the non-existence of 
regional revenues shown for Russia in Table 1 is quite different from the considerable 
regional ‗autonomy‘ noted in Table 2.  There are, of course, logical explanations for each 
of these apparent discrepancies.  For example:  
 
 With respect to China, for example, virtually all subnational revenues are shares 
of national taxes or revenues from taxes that are completely determined by the 
central government.   
 In the case of Russia, the explanation is in part one of timing: as discussed in 
Section 3 below the importance of regional taxes in Russia has changed 
substantially from year to year: indeed, at present the situation is unlike either that 
shown in Table 1 or in Table 2. 
 Finally, with respect to India, the explanation is simply the very small importance 
of local governments as a whole. 
 
An important point that emerges from this initial (partial) overview is thus simply that 
one should always view cross-country comparisons of subnational government finances 




  Nonetheless, there is still much that can be learned from 
considering how different countries have dealt with the issue of subnational taxation, as 
the case studies of experience in five large emerging countries in this paper illustrate.  
 
 
2. Subnational Taxation in Brazil 
 
 Brazil is by far the most decentralized country in Latin America, with 26 states 
(plus a Federal District), and over 5500 municipalities.  Since Brazil adopted its first 
federal constitution in 1891, it has since gone through several phases of decentralization 
and recentralization. Throughout much of Brazil‘s history the key political players have 
often been state governors, particularly those in the more important states such as Minas 
Gerais and Sao Paulo.  During the 20 years of the military dictatorship from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1980s Brazil went through a centralizing phase. With the return of 
democracy and the adoption of a new constitution in 1988, however, decentralization 
returned with a vengeance. At present, Brazil‘s fiscal structure gives both state and 
municipal governments an unusual amount of control over revenues and hence a 
substantial degree of fiscal autonomy.  
 
Tax assignment in Brazil is summarized in Table 3. Although income taxes, 
which account for over 40% of all taxes, are entirely federal, the single most important 
source of tax revenue, the sales tax, is split among all three levels of government, with 
the greatest share accruing to the states.  
 
Table 3 
Tax Assignment in Brazil 
 
Federal –  taxes on foreign trade 
corporate income taxes 
personal income taxes 
rural property taxes 
payroll taxes 
sales taxes (IPI) 
 
State --  taxes on property transfers
a 




Municipal -- taxes on property transfers
a 




Notes: (a) federal government sets rate but state and local governments define base and 
administer the tax; (b) federal government defines base and sets rate.
                                                 
1
 For discussion of the difficulties in making such comparisons and illustrations even in OECD countries, 
see OECD (1999, 2006); see also Ebel and Yilmaz (2003), Bird (2005), and Blochiger and King (2006). 
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Table 4 shows both the share of "own source" tax collection and, reflecting 
intergovernmental transfers of tax revenues (tax sharing), the share of taxes available to 





Brazil: Taxes by level of government, 2005 
 




 % GDP % Total  %GDP % Total  
Central 26.7 68.5  22.5 57.8  
State 10.1 25.9  9.8 25.2  
Local 2.2 5.5  6.7 17.1  
Total 38.9 100.0  38.9 100.0  
Notes: (a) taxes imposed and collected by level of government; 
           (b) taxes received after adding and subtracting tax revenue sharing. 
Source: Afonso and Araujo (2006). 
 
 
 Brazilian taxes are high even by developed country standards, around 39% 
(including Social Security) of GDP in 2005, with about 32% of this amount being 
collected directly by subnational governments, 26% by states alone (Serra and Afonso 
2007). In addition, subnational governments are entitled to about half the revenue from 
the three main federal taxes -- personal and corporate income tax and a limited VAT on 
goods at the manufacturing stage called the IPI (Imposto sobre Productos 
Industrializados).  The subnational share is split more or less equally between the states 
and municipalities, with the most important tax at each level being a sales tax – the ICMS 
(Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Servicos) at the state level and the ISS 
(Imposto sobre Servicos) at the local level.  Although most revenues are collected in the 
richer and more urbanized areas, they are distributed within each level of government on 
the basis of redistributive criteria.  In total, states control 25% of tax revenue in Brazil 
and municipalities -- the big gainers from revenue sharing -- 17%, for a total of 42%.   
 
 The final result of this complex system of tax assignment and intergovernmental 
transfers is that Brazil is one of the most fiscally decentralized countries in the world, 
with subnational governments accounting for close to three quarters of all expenditures. 
However, as Arretche (2007) notes, while the 1988 Constitution did grant broad tax 
autonomy to states and municipalities in the sense they can establish the rates of their 
own taxes, the federal government generally retains authority to establish both 
subnational tax bases and the conditions under which states and municipalities can 
exercise their fiscal authority.  Legislation governing subnational taxation is exactly like 
any other legislation as far as the federal government is concerned: there are no special 
rules that govern such legislation.   
 
                                                 
2
 See Afonso (2004) for similar annual figures for the 1988-2004 period.  Subsequent revisions to GDP 
figures lowered the gross tax ratio for 2005 to only 33.7% of GDP (Werneck 2007) but this revision does 
not affect the structural division of revenues which is the central issue here.   
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Moreover, since the only requirement for constitutional amendment is the 
approval of the central legislative bodies there is also no formal subnational veto of 
changes to their fiscal powers. Thus despite its fiscal decentralization, in Brazil, much 
more than in most developed country federations (e.g. Australia or the United States), the 
federal government can to a large extent do what it wants in principle when it comes to 
subnational taxes and often also, in the end, in practice.  If the states do not like the 
results, they must muster a majority of members of the federal legislature to vote down 
the legislation or, in some cases, a substantial minority in order to defeat a constitutional 
amendment.
3
 The experience of recent years suggests that state pressures on national 
legislatures are generally too weak and state delegations insufficiently cohesive to 
overcome the influence of the national government on most legislative decisions 
(Cheibub et al. 2006) 
 
 The most important state taxes are the ICMS, a VAT, and a tax on the ownership 
of vehicles.  The ICMS, introduced in the late 1960s to replace an earlier turnover tax, is 
particularly important, accounting for over half of state own revenues and most of the 
growth over time of those revenues.  The most important municipal taxes are those on 
urban property and on services not subject to tax under the ICMS.
4
  Brazil‘s federal VAT 
(IPI) applies at a variety of rates only selectively to industrial goods at the manufacturing 
and import level.  In contrast, the state VAT (ICMS) taxes the circulation of goods in 
general as well as some services (i.e., interstate and inter-municipal transportation and 
communication services).  In 2005, IPI revenue (1.2% of GDP) was less than 1/5 of the 
revenue yielded by the ICMS. In addition to these two general sales taxes, municipalities 
impose a sales tax (the ISS) on a specified list of services not reached by ICMS that 
yields about 0.4% of GDP.  In addition, parts of the contributions for the Social Security 
system (COFINS, Contribuição para o Financiamento da eguridade Socia,l and PIS, 
Programa de Integração Social)) are also imposed on business turnover and yield 
another 0.6% of GDP. In total, this array of taxes on goods and services account for a 
substantial proportion – over 40% -- of taxes in Brazil as well as 36% (of which almost 
two thirds came from ICMS) of the growth in the Brazilian tax ratio in the early years of 
this century (Afonso 2008). 
 
 
Reforming Indirect Taxes 
 
 It is thus not surprising that most of the extensive discussion on tax reform that 
has occurred in Brazil during the last decade has focused on simplifying and rationalizing 
its complex structure of indirect taxation.  Despite the federal influence over bases and 
rates noted earlier, in reality the important Brazilian indirect tax system has long been 
largely controlled by the states even during the military regime, when the rate setting 
power was given to the federal Senate.  Domestic and foreign experts alike unite in 
                                                 
3
 To pass a constitutional amendment requires a 3/5 majority in two rounds of voting in the two federal 
legislative houses (chamber of deputies and Senate). 
4
 The rural property tax is the responsibility of the central government, although 50% of the proceeds are 
shared with the municipalities. 
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categorizing the present system as both inefficient and potentially destabilizing.
5
  
Nonetheless, despite the overriding federal constitutional power noted above, the 
prospects of reforming the system remain fraught because, as Diaz-Cayeros (2006, 231) 
has stressed, "... Brazilian federalism is still characterized by the rejection of a centralized 
fiscal compromise.  States have not given up their capacity to tax, nor are they likely to 




 Brazil is one of three countries in the world with important subnational VATs; the 
other two are India and Canada.  It was the first to adopt such a tax and, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, since Brazil preceded even most European countries in adopting a VAT 
the initial version of the ICMS was defective in many ways (Ter-Minassian 1997).  A 
major reform introduced by the federal government in 1996 moved the state indirect tax 
base closer to the "normal" VAT by introducing zero rating for exports of non-
manufactured goods as well as an input tax credit for the purchase of capital goods.
7
  
Nonetheless many problems remain.  For instance, different rates apply to intrastate 
(usually 17%) and interstate transactions (12%, except for exports to less developed 
states at 7%). Since every state has its VAT law, there are actually 40 different rates -- 
with (tax-exclusive) rates as high as 40% on some sectors such as telecommunications 
(Werneck 2007) -- applying in Brazil‘s 27 states as well as different rules for crediting. 
These rates both complicate administration and facilitate evasion.  Both problems are 
exacerbated by the extent to which different states have granted exemptions and 
preferential treatments for different sectors to the point where this interstate competition 
for mobile investors is usually referred to in Brazil as a "fiscal war."
8
  In addition, the 
state VAT base is far from perfect: it excludes most services and appears to fall to a 




 Finally, each state imposes this tax on a production (origin) basis, applying the 
interstate rates just mentioned to sales within Brazil.  Since exports are zero rated, the 
result is that states that are net exporters may end up rebating taxes that were actually 
paid to other states (Longo 1990).  In effect, this is an exacerbated version of the same 
problem (with the Central Sales Tax) noted in Section 4 in India.  In both countries any 
                                                 
5
 For example, see the discussions by Ter-Minassian (1997), Rodden (2003), Rezende and Afonso (2006) 
and Facchini and Testa (2009). 
6
 Rezende and Afonso (2006, 180) make essentially the same point in a more negative fashion: "there is a 
broad consensus on the inadequacy of the Brazilian tax system.... nevertheless, no attempts to reform the 
tax system... have succeeded." 
7
 Serra and Afonso (2007) attribute some of the problems of recent years to this reform, however, 
particularly the abolition of ICMS on exports.  Revenue losses on this account were supposed to be 
compensated by a federal transfer; subsequently, however, constant friction about the amount and 
allocation of this transfer have exacerbated federal-state relations. 
8
 See Varsano (2001). An important recent example was the lobbying with respect to automobile assembly 
plants.  
9
 Werneck (2007) estimates that 17% of all indirect taxes fall on capital formation. Some states, such as 
Sao Paulo have in effect accentuated this problem by introducing a system of VAT ―withholding‖ that 
requires distributors to collect in advance the estimated ICMS that is estimated to be likely to be owed, but 
unlikely to be collected, from final sellers. However, it should also be mentioned that by administering its 
VAT in this way, Sao Paulo has to some extent ―broken‖ the chain of informality and hence, as was its 
intention, reduced tax evasion (de Paula and Scheinkman 2009).   
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solution will require substantial revenue redistribution across states and may not be 
feasible unless substantially sweetened by federal compensation.  Despite all these 
problems in the structure and operation of the ICMS, however, a recent detailed 
examination of state sales tax administrations suggests that in some states at least there 
have been substantial improvements in both collections and administration in recent years 
(Pinhanez 2007).   
 
An important aim in the ongoing tax reform discussion in Brazil in recent years 
has been to reform and simplify federal and state indirect taxes.
10
  A recent federal 
proposal, for example, while maintaining IPI more or less as it is would combine the two 
Social Security levies on turnover (COFINS and PIS) mentioned above with some other 
taxes such as that on motor fuels into a single tax (Brazil, Ministerio da Fazenda 2008).  
As with some past federal proposals, however, the envisaged objectives of the reform are 
somewhat more sweeping when it comes to the state ICMS, recommending the creation 
of new unified ICMS legislation at uniform rates to be determined by CONFAZ 
(National Council of Fiscal Policy) subject to approval by the federal Senate.   
 
The system proposed would have many advantages including the complete 
"untaxing" of exports as well as the end of the "fiscal war" between states.  It would also 
remove much of the present taxation that falls on business costs as well as reducing 
substantially the so-called "custo brasileiro‖ (Brazilian cost) imposed on enterprises by 
the present complex tax system. Perhaps in an effort to make this package more attractive 
to the states, in addition to guaranteeing them against revenue losses in adopting this 
proposal, the federal government also proposed removing the present constitutional 
requirement that a certain share of ICMS revenues must go to the municipalities (which, 
apparently, are also to receive a federal guarantee against revenue losses).   
 
This proposal is hardly the last word, however, as Brazil continues to generate a 
variety of ideas, if as yet not all that much action, with respect to tax reform.  For 
example, a competing proposal currently in the Senate would introduce a single 
integrated national VAT on both goods and services (incorporating the present Social 
Security contributions imposed on turnover) to be collected by the state governments, 
with the revenue being shared on the (destination) basis of consumption (Afonso 2008). 
No doubt still other ideas will emerge in the near future.  As yet, however, it is far from 
clear in which direction Brazil will move with respect to reforming indirect taxes or 
subnational taxation in general, let alone when it might do so. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Werneck (2007) discusses a number of diverse proposals for reforming indirect taxes that were 
considered during this period.  An important aspect of Brazilian tax reform that is not discussed here is the 
well-founded concern of the central government with the questionable nature of some of the taxes through 
which it has maintained and expanded its revenues over the last decade or so, particularly such cascading 
taxes as those on financial transactions. For an interesting argument that Brazil should, instead of 
eliminating such taxes, build on them to reform its fiscal system more broadly, see Cintra (2009). 
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Local Finance 
 
 Brazilian municipalities, like Brazilian states, appear at first glance to be far more 
fiscally autonomous than those in most countries. And so they are, again subject to the 
important and overriding constitutional principle that it is the federal government which 
establishes extensive and detailed legislation to control subnational taxes in most of their 
critical parameters (Arretche 2007).  Nonetheless, Brazilian municipalities are unique in 
the sense that they are not under the direct control of state governments in all respects. 
Although states do control the creation, consolidation and dissolution of municipalities, 
legally municipalities have the same status as states as members of the federation 
(Afonso and Araujo 2006).     
 
 As is common throughout the world, however, in Brazil as in most countries 
revenue-sharing and other transfers are the main source of revenue at the municipal level. 
In addition to federal tax-sharing transfers to municipalities (22.5% of the IPI and income 
tax collections as well as 50% of the rural land tax), the states as a whole now transfer 
more to municipalities than they receive from the federal government for their share of 
the same federal transfer, in large part because they are required to transfer 25% of ICMS 
revenues and 50% of their motor vehicle tax revenues to municipalities. At least 75% of 
the ICMS share must be distributed in proportion to operations in the municipalities, with 
the balance being shared by variety of different criteria in different states. The share of 
state motor vehicle tax revenues is distributed based on the number of licensed vehicles, 
just as the federal tax on rural land and property is shared according to the property 
located in the jurisdiction.  The larger federal tax-based transfer to municipalities takes a 
different form: 22.5% central collections of income taxes and IPI go to a "municipal 
participation fund" which is then distributed in a basically equalizing fashion, favoring 
small municipalities.  This favoritism is one reason for the substantial increase -- from 
3991 in 1980 to 5560 in 2006 -- in the number of municipalities in Brazil in recent years 
(Afonso and Arajuo 2006).  Municipalities also received significant additional transfers 
from the federal government particularly with respect to the health system.   
 
 The major own source revenues of municipalities are the tax on services (ISS), 
almost all of which is collected by the largest municipalities (Rezende and Garson 2006) 
and the urban property tax as well as a tax on property transfers.  Together these two 
sources account for almost 60% of total local taxes.  Total own revenues at the municipal 
level (including the important federal district which is treated differently in some 
respects), however, account for only 20% of municipal revenues in large cities and less 
than 10% in other areas, with the ISS and the two taxes on property being almost equally 
important and together accounting for about 80% of local taxes.  Although municipal 
taxes constitute little more than 5% of Brazil's high total tax ratio or about 2% of GDP, 
they have more than doubled in importance since the 1988 reform and are now more 
important in municipal total revenues than the mandatory federal transfer based on IPI 
and income tax revenues (Afonso and Araujo 2006). 
 
 ISS is imposed on all services except communications and interstate and intercity 
public transportation, which are taxed by the state ICMS.  Generally, the ISS is a fixed 
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percentage of retail sales although more presumptive methods of assessment are used in 
some cases.  National law fixes the minimum rate of the ISS at 2% as well as maximum 
rates that differ by the type of service, with the usual maximum being 5% of gross 
revenue.  The base of the ISS was expanded slightly a few years ago to include road tolls 
and the introduction of municipal public lighting fees. Both measures originated in 
actions by municipalities which were initially found by the courts to be unauthorized by 
law but were later legally enacted by federal legislation that ratified them.   
 
The general consensus appears to be that on the whole the ISS is poorly exploited 
by local governments and that the only way to tax services more effectively is probably 
to abolish the ISS and incorporate services fully into a comprehensive value-added tax 
(Werneck 2007).  While serious political opposition to this position is of course 
anticipated from local governments, little attention seems as yet to have been paid to the 
desirability of providing local governments, particularly those in large urban areas, with 
an adequately expansive source of revenue that is within their own control.   
 
Brazil's earlier experience with overly soft budget constraints at both the state and 
local levels (Rodden 2003) supports the importance of imposing adequately hard budget 
constraints on subnational governments.  It is difficult to see how this can be done in a 
sustainable way, however, when subnational governments are charged with carrying out 
activities which require increased financing unless those governments are themselves 
capable of and responsible for securing a significant proportion of the expanded revenue 
needs from their own citizens in a clearly accountable fashion. 
 
 Urban property tax is imposed on the assessed value of land and buildings and is 
completely administered by local governments, including the determination of rates.  
Significant administrative improvements in some cities in recent years have led to an 
increase in the importance of property taxes: for example, through simplified forms of 
mass appraisal, using a few readily observable and measurable characteristics of each 
property (Bahl et al. 2005).
11
 On the other hand, as Afonso (2007) emphasizes, as in most 
emerging countries the actual performance of most municipal property taxes in Brazil 
remains poor owing to inadequate laws, low rates, outdated property registers, and costly 




Brazil has long had a state VAT (ICMS) as well as a much more limited federal 
VAT (IPI) and a municipal tax on services (ISS). As in the case of India discussed below, 
the key immediate question with respect to subnational tax reform is to get the federal 
and state VATs in particular working better, and together.  In recent years many plans 
along these lines have been put forth by the federal government and others.  The current 
federal plan, for example, would clearly improve the VAT in Brazil substantially, but 
perhaps at the unnecessary expense of reducing state fiscal autonomy too much.  As Bird 
(2010) discusses, in principle both levels of government can tax essentially the same base 
                                                 
11
 Afonso (2007) notes that in Sao Paulo taxpayers whose fiscal relations with the city government are 
conducted electronically can save up to 50% on local property taxes -- a not insignificant incentive. 
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with the tax being administered either by one level or by both levels in a closely 
coordinated fashion while still allowing the states substantial rate flexibility. Canada now 
does this; India is on the road to doing so. However, it is as yet unclear in which direction 
Brazil will move with respect to reforming indirect taxes or subnational taxation in 
general, let alone when it might do so.  
 
At the municipal level, the consensus appears to be that on the whole the ISS is 
poorly exploited by local governments and that the only way to tax services more 
effectively is probably to abolish the ISS and incorporate services fully into a 
comprehensive value-added tax.  However, perhaps insufficient attention has been paid to 
the desirability of providing local governments, particularly those in large urban areas, 
with an adequately expansive source of revenue that is within their own control.  In 
addition, since the performance of most municipal property taxes in Brazil seems to be 
relatively poor, there is, as always, considerable room for further reform of this tax 
 
 




 Russia began the process of evolving a modern tax and intergovernmental fiscal 
system from the unpropitious launching pad of a central planning system.  Three 
important problems had to be dealt with: the development of an adequate tax 
administration, the implementation of a modern tax structure, and the evolution of a 
sound system of intergovernmental finance. As Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace 
(2008) discuss, over the last two turbulent decades Russia has to a considerable extent 
accomplished the second of these tasks.  Like every country‘s tax structure, Russia's is far 
from perfect.  Nonetheless, in principle at least it perhaps now provides a generally sound 
basis for future development.
13
  Some limited progress has also been made on the other 
two fronts mentioned.  Indeed, Russia (unlike China) has, after considerable vicissitudes 
and not without difficulty, established some limited but genuine subnational taxes.  As 
Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace (2008) and especially De Silva et al. (2009) 
discuss in detail, however, there is still much room for improvement with respect both to 
tax administration and to clarifying and strengthening subnational finances.   
 
 Initially, in Russia (as in China) the old central planning system of treating all 
revenues physically collected in a jurisdiction – for example, because a head office was 
located there – as ―belonging‖ to that jurisdiction was carried over into the new tax 
system -- but only partly.  A city with a vodka distillery or a region with an oil well, for 
example, under the old system felt ―entitled‖ to all the fiscal proceeds derived from these 
sources, even though in economic terms most of the taxes thus collected were probably 
being paid by consumers elsewhere.
14
   
 
                                                 
12
 This section draws heavily on material from Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace (2008) as well as 
Bird (2003); see also De Silva et al. (2009). 
13
 For an interesting discussion by an insider, see Shatalov (2006). 
14
 As noted below, under the new system the application of the derivation principle for major shared taxes 
produced results that were, if not exactly the same, largely similar. 
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This approach encouraged subnational governments to consider all the money 
flowing from their territory as ―their‖ contribution to the central government, and then to 
net these outflows against explicit federal inflows in order to assess whether they are 
gainers or losers in the federal fiscal game.  While such ―balance-sheet federalism‖ is not 
unknown in other countries, it makes no sense to ignore the real economic incidence of 
taxes and expenditures, as such calculations invariably do.
15
  What matters in efficiency 
terms is not who collects (or receives) the revenue, but who decides and who pays.  These 
are very different questions. Establishing a clear connection between those who decide 
how much governments should spend on what, those who pay fiscally for these decisions, 
and those who benefit from them is critical to sound public sector policy (Bird et al. 
2003).   
 
Of course, when some areas are rich and others are poor, any significant 
decentralization of revenue will eventually exacerbate regional disparities.  This outcome 
is frequently modified by transfers or by treating different areas asymmetrically in some 
other way.   Every federation has some asymmetry in its fiscal system to some degree 
(Watts, 2000).
16
  Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001) and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) 
argue that Russia in the 1990s went too far in the direction of differential treatment, 
although Treisman (1999) suggested that to some extent what was done along these lines 
under the Yeltsin government may at the time have been essential to national survival.  
Subsequently, however, as De Silva et al. (2009) discuss in detail, the Putin government 
undertook a substantial degree of recentralization, going even further than the 1994 
reform in China discussed in Section 5 below.   
 
Table 5 illustrates some of the major changes in revenue sharing in Russia over 
the last two decades, and Table 6 summarizes the current revenue assignment set out in 
the Tax Code.  As Table 6 suggests, at present all major revenue sources are in effect 
assigned to the federal government.
17
 As Table 5 shows, however, all of the proceeds of 
the personal income tax, some excises and land and property taxes flow to subnational 
governments, as do half the yield of the liquor excise, a small fraction of extraction taxes 
and almost three-quarters of the enterprise profits tax.  In all these cases, however, since 
the tax rate and base are established entirely by the federal government these are not 
―genuine‖ subnational taxes.18
                                                 
15
 This issue is discussed in detail in Bird (2005); for an attempt to make a more ‗economic‘ calculation of 
interregional fiscal flows (for Canada), see Vaillancourt and Bird (2007). 
16
 For a thorough examination of this issue, see Bird and Ebel (2007). 
17
 In 2004, for instance, VAT accounted for 48% of all taxes and customs duties for 38%, with enterprise 
and income taxes accounting for 9% each and excises.  These are all federal taxes although, as shown in 
Table 4, some of the revenue may be allocated to the regions. 
18
 For an extended discussion of this point, see Bird (2009). 
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25 100 0 100 0 
Profits 37 63 31 69
b 
27 73 
PIT 14 86 1 99 0 100 
Liquor 
Excise 
50 50 50 50 50 50 
Energy 
Excises 
100 0 100 0 -- -- 
Other 
Excises 
0 100 0 100 0 100 
Oil extraction -- -- -- -- 95 5 
Gas extraction -- -- -- -- 100 0 





70 0 100 
Social 
Security 
100 0 100 0 100 0 
Notes: (a) VAT on imports exclusively federal; (b) from 2001 to 2004, regional share included a 
share earmarked for local government; (c) tax revenues from agricultural land were shared 
differently. 
Source: Martinez Vazquez, Rider and Wallace (2008).  
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Taxes and royalties on natural resource extraction 
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Individual property tax 
Land tax 
 
Source: Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace (2008).
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Indeed, the history of subnational taxation in Russia shows clearly that the 
amount and nature of the revenues received by its regional and local governments are 
now determined almost exclusively by the central government.  With the exception of a 
short period in the 1990s when regional governments did have a certain degree of fiscal 
autonomy, the situation in Russia in reality thus seems rather similar to that in China 
discussed in a later section.
19
  However, in Russia (as is also true in China and India, but 
not in Brazil or Nigeria) the regional levels of government continue to have significant 
autonomy when it comes to how much of the revenue that passes through their hands 
they redirect to local governments.  In other words, local governments, like regional 
governments, are largely at the fiscal mercy of the next higher level of government.  
 
 As Bird (2010) stresses, unless subnational governments have significant freedom 
to alter the level and composition of their revenues, neither autonomy nor accountability 
can be fully meaningful.  In particular, as noted earlier, if – as in a federal system - 
subnational governments are expected to exercise some independent authority in 
particular areas --  they should be able to set tax rates (albeit perhaps within limits).
20
  
Such rate flexibility is essential if a tax is to be adequately responsive to local needs and 
decisions, while remaining politically accountable to their citizens.  Canada and Russia, 
for instance, are almost at opposite ends with respect to this critical aspect of fiscal 
federalism at the regional level. 
  
 Understandably, subnational governments that have access to revenues from 
sources for which they are not accountable to their citizen-taxpayers will -- like national 
governments -- prefer to exploit such sources rather than openly tax their own residents.  
However, doing so largely obviates the basic efficiency argument for their existence.  
The access of subnational governments to taxes that fall mainly on nonresidents -- such 
as most natural resource levies, corporate income taxes, pre-retail stage sales taxes and, to 
some extent, even nonresidential real property taxes – should therefore be limited, if at all 
possible.  The importance of this consideration with respect to natural resource revenues 
was stressed with respect to Russia in Wallich (1994), for example, and has frequently 
been a matter of concern in other countries, notably Nigeria (as discussed in Section 6 
below).  Similar problems arise with many other taxes. Even most so-called ―retail‖ sales 
taxes, for example, often fall to a considerable extent on business inputs:  In Canada, for 
example, one study found that up to 50 percent of the retail sales tax base in some 
provinces consisted of such inputs (Kuo, McGirr, and Poddar 1988).
21
  Similarly, a high 
                                                 
19
 See, for instance, the discussion in Shalatov (2006) with respect to the gradual evisceration and then 
elimination of the regional sales tax in Russia.  In Russia, as in China, at bottom ―the pertinent question is 
whether fiscal federalism is possible in the absence of political decentralization and whether political 
decentralization is possible without some degree of revenue autonomy‖ (De Silva et al., 2009, 106). 
20
 A minimum rate may be needed to prevent distorting "tax competition" (with richer jurisdictions -- those 
with larger tax bases -- lowering rates to attract still more tax base).  A maximum rate may similarly be 
needed to prevent distorting "tax exporting" (as when jurisdictions in which breweries or gas distribution 
pipelines are located impose especially heavy taxes on such facilities in the expectation that the taxes will 
ultimately be paid by persons not resident in the jurisdiction). 
21
 Ring (1999) shows that the same is true with respect to retail sales taxes in the United States. Of course, 
one might make the case that a ―perfect‖ retail sales tax may in principle be as or more successful than the 
―average‖ VAT in removing taxes on business inputs.  However, no such RST has yet been observed in any 
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proportion of local property taxes levied on businesses are likely exported to other 
jurisdictions (Ballantine and Thirsk 1982).  Such concerns seem equally relevant with 
respect to enterprise taxes at the subnational level (Wallich 1994). When subnational 
governments depend heavily on such taxes, the critical connection between spending and 
revenue-raising is broken.   
 
 If inappropriate tax bases are assigned to sub-national governments, an all too 
likely result is an undesirable combination of wasteful competition and politically 
unaccountable tax exporting.  In Russia, for example, where most enterprise profits taxes 
are assigned to regional governments on the basis of derivation, this is certainly true (as it 
is in China).
22
 It was even truer in the early 1990s when the VAT was – as it still is in 
China -- partly assigned to regions on a derivation bases as well as in the late 1990s when 
a separate regional sales tax was in force in many regions (see Martinez-Vazquez, Rider 
and Wallace 2008). 
 
 One way to deal with such problems might be to establish a uniform set of tax 
bases for local governments (perhaps different for different categories such as large 
metropolitan cities and small rural municipalities), with a limited amount of rate 
flexibility (Bird 2010). From this perspective, the present assignment of taxes to regional 
governments in Russia seems deficient.  Significant vertical imbalance remains between 
expenditures and revenues in Russia, with consequent implications for autonomy, 
efficiency, and accountability.
23
 While the recentralization of the VAT and elimination of 
the regional sales tax along with other changes have undoubtedly reduced the costs of 
administration, costs of compliance, and costs arising from tax-induced inefficiencies 
arising from the previous confusing subnational tax system in Russia (Shatalov 2006), 




Financing Regional and Local Governments 
 
 If Russia‘s central government wanted to develop a more fiscally responsible 
subnational fiscal structure, the most important issue facing Russia it would face would 
be to develop a satisfactory revenue base for regional governments -- one for which those 
governments are politically responsible.  More could be done, for instance, to permit 
                                                                                                                                                 
country. Indeed, as Tait (1988) notes, this problem was one of the major reasons that led Norway to adopt 
VAT to replace its existing (high rate) RST. 
22
 De Silva et al. (2009, 73-74) provide several examples of such regional tax competition. 
23
 This vertical imbalance is greater than the numbers one usually sees may indicate since, although part of 
the proceeds of many taxes accrue to subnational governments, those governments have little or no say 
over the rate or base of such taxes: what is going on is really that a central tax is levied and then transferred 
to the region in which it is collected.  As Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001) stress, this statement is not 
entirely true since the curious ―dual subordination‖ of the tax administration in Russia means that the actual 
collection effort is to some extent responsive to local as well as national pressures.  Nonetheless, regional 
governments in Russia are clearly far more dependent on central tax policy than is true in most developed 
country federations: see e.g. Bird (1986) for a comparison of Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland, and the United States as well as Bird and Tarasov (2004) for a quantitative comparison of 
these countries (as well as Belgium and Spain).  
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differential regional excise taxes, especially on vehicles and fuels, and perhaps even 
regional differentials in personal income taxes.  Given the evolution of the personal 
income tax in Russia, the last of these possibilities seems unlikely (Shatalov 2006).    
Nonetheless, when regional governments have significant expenditure responsibilities, as 
they do in Russia, there appear to be only two important revenue sources that can be 
levied relatively efficiently at the subnational level -- a surcharge on the central personal 
income tax (PIT) or some form of consumption tax like the VAT.  On the whole, 
"piggybacking" through surcharges on the national PIT or VAT appears to be the most 
viable way in which subnational governments could continue to be large spenders while 
becoming more politically accountable to their own people.   
 
  At one point, income tax surcharges did appear to have been the chosen 
instrument for this purpose in Russia. In the 1999 budget, for instance, regions were 
empowered to levy a rate of up to 35 percent in addition to then federal PIT rate of 3 
percent.  This allocation presumably reflected that fact that, until then, 100 percent of the 
PIT had gone to the regions.  However, regions were to have no discretion in setting their 
tax rate.  In 2000 the attempt to follow the surtax route was dropped and most (84 
percent) of PIT revenue was allocated to the regional governments, with the balance to 
the federal government.  When a flat 13% PIT rate was introduced in 2001, only 1% of 
PIT revenues accrued to the federal government with the remainder going to the regions. 
Since 2002 all PIT revenue has gone to the regional governments. Nonetheless there is no 




 Curiously, Russia does operate a piggyback scheme with respect to the enterprise 
profits tax (EPT) -- and indeed one with a considerable degree of regional discretion.  
Regional governments are permitted to reduce the tax rate by up to four percentage 
points, so that the regional rate can vary between 13.5 and 17.5%, compared to a federal 
rate of 6.5%.  Unfortunately, as US experience made clear long ago (McLure 1986), 
subnational taxes on company profits are invariably problematic especially when regional 
tax base differences are accentuated, as in Russia, by apportioning profits to the regions 
in which companies locate their headquarters.  The potential for wasteful regional 
competition is clear, as is the incentive for regions that benefit from the present system to 




 A more promising answer for subnational revenues may perhaps lie in 
consumption taxation.  Russia was probably quite right to move away from the original 
system -- still largely employed in China -- under which a portion of the VAT was 
distributed amongst regions.  On the other hand, a differential regional surcharge on the 
federal VAT seems quite feasible in principle (Bird and Gendron 2001).   Such a tax 
already exists and works well in Canada (Bird and Gendron 2009).  While the Brazilian 
experience discussed in Section 2 above has often been used to argue against the use of 
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 Interestingly, Australia is in the same situation with respect to the VAT: the tax is a federal tax but all the 
revenues go to the states: for further discussion, see Bird and Smart (2009). 
25
 Similar problems have emerged in India and Brazil. In Russia, with some exceptions (De Silva et al. 
2009), they have essentially been overcome by fiat, and in India in part by compensation; so far such 
problems largely remain unresolved in Brazil, as discussed earlier in Section 2 above. 
18 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
subnational VATs in developing countries, that experience has not been as bad in all 
respects as has sometimes been asserted (Pinhanez 2007).  Moreover, in principle it 
appears feasible to implement regional surcharges in some instances even in countries 
with less well-developed tax administrations.
26
 Although this path to increasing 
responsible regional taxation in Russia would not be either simple or straightforward, it 
may perhaps warrant further exploration – always provided, of course, that the central 
authorities actually wish to implement a sound and sustainable fiscally decentralized 
system.   
 
 An alternative approach, one that also works quite well in Canada, actually 
existed in Russia for number of years in the form of an independent regional sales tax.
27
 
In 1998, following a brief earlier experience with regional sales tax, the federal 
government attempted to make a substantial reduction in the regional VAT share more 
acceptable by permitting regional governments to impose a sales tax.  Unusually, regional 
governments were allowed to choose to impose the tax or not, to determine its base, and 
to set the rate up to a maximum of 5%.  Over the next few years, as more regions began 
to introduce the tax and its administration improved revenue from the sales tax more than 
doubled -- rising to 8.5% of subnational tax revenue in 2001. Because regions had to give 
up certain other taxes in order to impose the sales tax, some regions chose not to do so in 
part (presumably because they may have lost revenue on balance). 
 
 In response to many problems arising from the original ambiguity and poor 
drafting of the sales tax law, it was revised when incorporated in the tax code in 2001.  
The tax base was defined uniformly as the sales to individuals of goods and services 
within the territory of a given region, subject to a list of exempt goods similar to that for 
the VAT.  However, there continued to be a number of differences in the application of 
this tax in different regions; for example, some regions exempted basic foodstuffs only if 
they were produced within the region.  Moreover, although only sales to individuals were 
supposed to be taxed -- that is, business purchases were supposed to be exempt -- there 
remained many problems in implementing this exemption. Finally, since the tax was not 
supposed to be reported separately to consumers, its potential relevance as a basis for 
citizens to evaluate the efficiency and efficacy of their governments was clearly limited.  
Despite these and other problems, in many ways it was unfortunate that the regional sales 
tax was abolished in 2004. In principle it may be both feasible and attractive to impose a 
federal VAT and a regional retail sales tax on essentially the same tax base and either to 
have both administered by the same authority or to coordinate the two administrations 
closely.
28
   
 
 Turning to local as distinct from regional taxes, apart from user charges, there 
seem to be only two major possibilities for an improved tax base in Russia as in most 
                                                 
26
 See, for example, Varsano (2000), Keen and Smith (2000), McLure (2000) and Bird and Gendron 
(2000). 
27
 This discussion is based largely on Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace (2008), Shatalov (2006), and 
Mikesell (1999). 
28
 No country now does this, but Canada comes close and in some ways so did France when it first 
introduced its VAT: this possibility appears to warrant further detailed exploration in the context of 
particular countries. 
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countries -- a revised, and revived, property tax and some better form of local business 
taxation.  As already mentioned, there is much to be said for property taxes as a source of 
local finance.  Unfortunately, as experience in a number of countries suggests (Bird and 
Slack 2004), it is likely to be many years before this tax can provide consistent and 
significant revenues in Russia (as in most transitional countries), in part since the 
ownership of some of the potential tax base remains murky.
29
  Even if these problems 
could be overcome, while the property tax is certainly a potentially important source of 
local revenue, it is unlikely to provide sufficient resources to finance local public services 
in the near future in Russia.  Indeed, even countries with well-established property taxes 
have been hard-pressed to maintain revenues in the face of inflation and political 
difficulties, as Bird (2010) discusses. 
 
 Major policy reforms are needed to turn the property tax into a responsive 
instrument of local fiscal policy in Russia.  First, and most importantly, as emphasized 
earlier, local governments must be allowed to set their own tax rates, probably within 
some limits.  Secondly, the tax base must be maintained adequately.  Property assessment 
is both a technical and a controversial matter, and much effort and considerable resources 
are required to establish and maintain the tax base. Finally, as with all taxes in Russia, 
major procedural reforms are needed to improve collection efficiency, valuation 
accuracy, and the coverage of the potential tax base (Timofeev 2004).  None of these 
steps is easy, but there are no short cuts to successful local property taxation (Kelly 





 Given the considerable investment needed in Russia to create a significant 
property tax, perhaps the more immediately critical problem facing local government in 
Russia is to reform the present unsatisfactory sub-national taxes on business. While the 
ability to distort market conditions through such taxes should be severely restricted, as 
noted earlier, there is both an economic (benefit) case for some regional and local 
taxation of business and, it seems, often an overwhelming political need for genuinely 
responsive and responsible local leaders to impose such taxes (Bird 2003a).  Indeed, 
given the restrictions on other taxes and the unreliability of central transfers, local 
business taxes may sometimes provide almost the only way in which local governments 
in countries like Russia are able to expand revenues in response to perceived local needs.  
Certainly, they are preferable to the EBF free-for-all in China discussed in Section 5 





 Unfortunately, most forms of local and regional business taxes found around the 
world -- corporate income taxes, trade taxes, business taxes, differentially heavy non-
                                                 
29
 As Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001), p. 55, put it: ―The lack of real estate markets, land ownership, 
and multiple institutional constraints are powerful obstacles for the development of an ad valorem real 
estate property tax in Russia.‖  For a review of such taxes around the world, see Bird and Slack (2004). 
30
 For a brief discussion of the Russian and Ukrainian systems, see Bird and Wallace (2004). 
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residential property taxes, and even sales taxes (which are in practice often levied on 
estimated gross receipts) may introduce serious economic distortions. One way to reduce 
such problems that has recently been suggested is through imposing a so-called   
―business value tax‖ (BVT) – in essence, a relatively low rate flat tax levied on an 
income-type value-added base. This possibility is discussed further in Bird (2003a, 2010).   
 
 The earlier suggestion of a possible regional VAT surcharge – or perhaps a 
regional sales tax imposed on final sales to consumers in the region using the same tax 
base as the federal VAT basis -- was motivated primarily by the desire to provide more 
adequate ―own‖ revenues to regional governments and hence to encourage greater fiscal 
responsibility and accountability.  In contrast, the BVT is intended primarily to improve 
the allocative efficiency of sub-national revenue systems by, in effect, charging 
businesses for the public productive services of which they make use.  In effect, such a 
tax might be thought of as a sort of generalized benefit tax -- one that, unlike the 
enterprise profits tax or the differentially heavier taxes often imposed on business real 
property, is nondistortionary.  Such a tax might, for example, be imposed at the regional 
level replacing the present distortionary regional EPTs.
31
  Local governments might then 
be able to impose a surcharge on the regional tax to replace all or most of the present 
confusing array of business taxes.
32
  A tax along these lines would probably not 
encounter a very receptive political or business audience in Russia today.  Nonetheless, 
such an approach may offer a potentially promising alternative to the spectre of  
increasing, and distorting, sub-national business taxes that may otherwise loom in 
Russia‘s future -- as well as, perhaps, to the more general question of how best to tax 




Summing Up   
 
Russia was probably correct in moving away from the original system -- still 
largely employed in China -- under which a portion of the VAT was distributed amongst 
regions.  Similarly, the abolition of the highly imperfect regional sales tax was perhaps 
equally justifiable.  Nonetheless, if there are to be any real regional-level governments in 
Russia, in many ways consumption taxation -- either a differential regional surcharge on 
the federal VAT or a revived regional sales tax imposed on the same base as the federal 
VAT and administered federally – remains a logical choice.  If moves in this direction are 
considered to be a step too far in current Russian circumstances, but it is nonetheless 
desired to give some flexibility to regional governments an alternative might perhaps be 
to consider permitting some regional variations in the current flat-rate PIT, all the 
revenues of which already flow to the regions.  
 
Turning to local as distinct from regional taxes, apart from user charges there 
seem to be only two major possibilities for an improved tax base in Russia (as in most 
                                                 
31
 For a similar proposal (including an empirical application) in the Canadian context, see Bird and 
McKenzie (2001). 
32
 The structure would essentially be similar to that of the existing Italian IRAP, which has both regional 
and local rates (Bird 2003a).  
33
 See, for example, the recent discussions of these issues in World Bank (2007) and Corthay (2009). 
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countries) -- a revised, and revived, property tax and some better form of local business 
taxation. In particular, a better business tax should be imposed at the regional level to 
replace the present distortionary regional EPTs, perhaps with local governments being 
allowed to impose a surcharge on the regional tax Of course, none of these suggested 
change is likely to be popular with ordinary Russians and it seems unlikely at present that 
the central government is actively interested in bestowing any real fiscal autonomy on 
subnational governments.  Nonetheless, if fiscal decentralization is to be effective, as a 
rule it needs to be accompanied by at least a modicum of political decentralization.  If it 
is not, there are relatively few lessons that such countries can learn from either the 









 Since India, like Brazil, is a well-established federal country it is appropriate to 
begin with a brief discussion of the basic formal structure of the Indian fiscal system.  
India has been a federation since the adoption of its Constitution in 1950 so it is not 
surprising that issues of federal finance have been a persistent concern over the years 
despite a constitutional set-up that allows the central government substantial room to 
control, regulate and even replace state governments.
35
 The issue of center-state fiscal 
relations is highlighted every five years by the report of a Finance Commission which 
determines the percentage of the net proceeds of central revenues to be assigned to the 
states, subject to the constraint that taxes devolved from the center and other transfers 
such as those by the Planning Commission should not exceed 37.5% of central 
revenues.
36
 Although non-binding, the recommendations of all Finance Commissions to 
date have been accepted with minor exceptions.   
 
For many years the taxes shared were essentially personal income tax and excise 
duties (except alcohol, which is taxed by the states).  Following lengthy negotiations, 
however, a simplified system that shares a proportion of overall central tax revenues was 
established a few years ago.  These shared taxes together with central transfers have 
always constituted a major source of main revenue for states, which over the years have 
grown from the original 14 to 28 in number.  (There are also seven territories including 
the national capital territory, Delhi.)  Over the years the Finance Commissions have 
developed a series of complex formulae -- the overall rationale of which is somewhat 
difficult to understand -- that are used to divide the state share of tax revenue among the 
different states. 
 
                                                 
34
 I am indebted to Govinda Rao and Arindam Das-Gupta for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
section, although of course I am solely responsible for what is said here. 
35
 The strong federal power to override state decisions led Wheare (1963) to categorize India as a quasi-
federal country. In recent decades, however, states appear to have been able to act relatively independently 
in most respects. 
36
 However, as Singh and Srinivasan note (2006, 340) the ceiling does not seem to encompass loans (which 
are usually very soft) and various forms of implicit transfers from center to the states. 
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 The taxes that may be levied by the states are set out in the Constitution and are 
clearly separated from those that may be levied by the federal government (the Union): 
see Table 7.  Essentially, India has always followed the principle of tax separation: that 
is, any one type of tax should be levied by only one level of government.  Moreover, as in 
most federal states, the most important taxes – income and corporate taxes and excises -- 
were consciously assigned to the central government. Unusually, however, the authority 
to levy taxes on agricultural income and property is assigned solely to the state 
governments. Although (or perhaps because) most Indians are still engaged in 
agriculture, in reality agricultural income (or property) is taxed in only a few states, and it 
is nowhere taxed effectively. States also have authority to impose, subject to a relatively 
low ceiling, what is in effect a (presumed) income tax on the self-employed -- the 
"professions tax."  However, some states do not impose this tax at all, and even when it is 
imposed it generally amounts to little more than yet another tax withheld from some 
salaried employees in larger organized firms.  
 
 More generally, in spite of the long list of taxes assigned to the states by the 
Constitution, such possible state taxes as electricity tax, entertainment and hotel tax, and 
transportation tax are seldom utilized effectively.  The major source of state tax revenue 
in India has always been some form of sales tax.  In fact, constitutionally final sales can 
only be taxed by states, although in practice administrative difficulties in collecting sales 
taxes over time led most states to shift the tax largely to the stage of production, thus in 
effect overlapping much of the base of the center‘s consumption taxes (manufacturing 
excises).  As noted below, by far the most important change in India‘s tax structure in 
recent years has been the further gradual evolution of both the federal and state general 
consumption taxes towards a VAT.  
 
The fundamental interdependence of the tax bases of the center and the states 
makes it impossible to demarcate tax bases as clearly as the Constitution attempts to do. 
Overlapping has been particularly important in the area of sales taxation.  As in other 
federal countries, to avoid the worst economic effects from the resulting complex (and, in 
terms of both administrative and compliance costs, costly) situation a considerable degree 
of coordination and harmonization is required.  India has moved significantly in this 
direction in the last few years.  However, as discussed further below, it still has some 
distance to go. 
 
Both urban and rural local governments -- the two have always been clearly 
distinguished in India -- were also given limited taxing power in the Constitution.  In 
1993, an important constitutional amendment substantially enhanced their role and, in 
particular, permitted rural local governments (panchayats) for the first time to collect 
directly some local taxes. In addition, each state was required to set up a State Finance 
Commission to assign the revenue of certain state taxes to the panchayats and in general 
to ensure that both rural and urban local governments received adequate financial 
resources. In fiscal terms, India today is thus in principle a sort of ‗cascading‘ federalism, 
with most revenues being collected at the center but with a substantial portion being 
passed on to the state governments which in turn pass on a share of their own revenues 
from all sources to rural and urban local governments. 
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Table 7 
Tax Assignment in India 
Central government 
 Taxes on income other than agricultural income 
Customs duties including export duties 
Excise duties except alcohol and narcotics 
Corporation tax 
Taxes on capital value of assets exclusive of agricultural land 
Taxes on capital of companies 
Estate duty except on agricultural land 
Succession duties except agricultural land 
Taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway sea or air 
Taxes on transactions in stock exchanges and future markets 
Stamp duties on bills of exchange, checks, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of 
credit, insurance policies, transfer of shares, adventures, proxies in receipts 
Taxes on newspapers (including advertisements) 
Taxes on interstate consignment of goods 




Taxes on agricultural income 
Succession duties on agricultural land 
Estate duty on agricultural land 
Taxes on land and buildings 
Taxes on mineral rights (subject to limitations imposed by Parliament) 
Excise duty on alcohol beverages and narcotics (including countervailing duty at the 
same rates on imports from other states or territories) 
Taxes on the entry of goods into local area for consumption, use or sale 
Tax on consumption or sale of electricity 
Taxes on sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers 
Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways 
Taxes on vehicles suitable for use on roads 
Taxes on animals and boats 
Tolls 
Taxes on professions, trades, and employments 
Capitation taxes 
Taxes on luxuries including entertainments, amusements and gambling 
Stamp duties not assigned to the central government 
 
Local government 
Rural local governments are assigned 20 exclusive taxes including octroi (a tax on the 
entry of goods), property taxes, produce taxes and professional labor taxes as well as 
seven tax is concurrent with state governments including taxes on annual crops and land. 
Urban local governments have nine exclusive taxes in which octroi and property taxes are 
most important.  Others include taxes on vehicles and professions.  In addition they have 
11 concurrent taxes with state governments.  There are wide variations across states and 
the level and structures of both urban and rural local government revenues. 
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As yet, however, the system below the state level does not appear to be functioning 
particularly well in most states. The recommendations of the State Finance Commissions seem 
seldom to have been implemented and in any case few of these commissions have done much to 
clarify local taxing powers (Singh and Srinivasan 2006). Indeed, a consistent note sounded in 
almost all studies of local finance in India is that the general lack of data renders it difficult to 




 This brief introductory overview of the complex development of fiscal federalism in 
India suggests that at least three important intergovernmental fiscal problems remain to be 
resolved.  The first is the creation of adequately "hard" budget constraints at both the state and 
local levels of government. This task is both particularly important and particularly difficult 
because India‘s central government has for some years itself been running a significant deficit.38  
The second and closely related task is to establish clearly delineated and properly functioning tax 
systems at both the state and local levels of government.  The third (and inextricably connected) 
task is to reform consumption taxes again at both the central and state levels -- and perhaps even 
eventually at the local level.  Because substantial progress has been made in reforming 
consumption taxation in India in recent years, and success in this task is an essential element in 
tackling the other two tasks mentioned, it is appropriate to begin with this question. 
 
 
Sales Tax Reform 
 
 The 1950 Constitution assigned taxes on manufacturing to the central government and 
taxes on sales to the state governments.  Services were not mentioned except for a few specific 
items such as hotels and restaurants that were to be taxed by the states, although the center had 
residual powers to tax other services.  For many years, the central government imposed a tax at 
various rates on manufactured goods – the Union excise duty.   This central excise was included 
in the state sales tax base.  In addition, interstate trade was generally taxed at a uniform rate of 
4% under what is called the Central Sales Tax -- although the revenues were both collected and 
retained by the state of origin.  This rate was considerably lower than taxes on sales within states, 
resulting in substantial evasion. Services essentially were not taxed except for a few at the state 
level.   
 
 Beginning in the mid-1980s, the central government gradually began to introduce the 
credit principle of VAT and to reduce considerably a number of tax rates: the resulting sales tax 
was called Modified VAT or MODVAT. By 2005 many services were taxed by the central 
government and the number of tax rates had been reduced to two -- 8% and 16% (with a few 
higher rates applied to a few articles).  The new tax was called Central VAT or CENVAT.  
However, it was still not a full VAT for several reasons (Shome 2008):   
 
 First, as in China (Wong and Bird 2008) full credit is not given for capital goods 
purchases: although initially credit was allowed, it was subsequently given only over a 
two-year period, essentially for revenue reasons.   
                                                 
37
 See, for example, World Bank (2004) , Bahl et al. (2005), and Datta (2008). 
38
 This important issue is not discussed in detail here: for a detailed discussion of the "softness" of the state budget 
constraints in India, see McCarten (2003). 
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 Second, owing to the different excise rates and the fact that the single rate service tax is 
different (12%), input tax credits accumulated over time.   
 Finally, and most importantly, taxes on goods beyond in manufacturing stage could not 
be credited at the central level since they were taxed only at the state level.  
 
Future reforms in CENVAT hinge to a large extent on what happens to the state sales taxes. 
 
 Fortunately, state sales taxes have been changed even more than the federal (Union) 
central sales tax in recent years.  Unlike Brazil where, as discussed in Section 2 above,  state 
sales tax reform has largely been in the hands of a centrally convened body (CONFAZ), in India 
state sales tax reform has been in the hands of what is called the Empowered Committee (EC) 
which is constituted by the state finance ministers.  Following an initial stage during which the 
EC harmonized state sales taxes to some extent by introducing floor rates for four commodity 
groups and freezing tax incentives, a state level VAT was introduced in 2005.  At the last minute, 
however, some states controlled by parties that were in opposition to the central government 
dropped out.  To break the impasse, the central government agreed to compensate states that 
adopted VAT if they had less than 17.5% growth in revenue after adopting the tax: compensation 
would be equal to 100% of the difference in the first year, 75% in the second year and 50% in 
the third year.  This offer did the trick, and eventually all states (and Union territories) adopted 
VATs.  Since the actual revenue growth turned out to be close to 25%, no compensation was 
required in the end.   
 
Perhaps the most encouraging feature of this story is that the significant changes brought 
about by the EC demonstrate that even in the always turbulent Indian political scene effective 
inter-state coordination is possible and can yield major benefits.
39
  As is not uncommon, the 
process of reaching agreement among India's very heterogeneous states took longer than 
originally envisaged.  Nonetheless, in the end agreement was reached not only on a common 
standard rate but also on such critical building blocks for the future as a common classification of 
goods for central and state taxes and common taxpayer identification numbers. 
 
 There are two state VAT rates -- 4% and 12.5%, with the latter (standard) rate at the retail 
level being close to the effective level of the federal standard rate (16% at the manufacturing 
level).  In effect, state and federal governments in India thus now divide the sales tax base more 
or less evenly.  Although the central sales tax on interstate trade by 2009 had been reduced to 2% 
and is supposed to be abolished by 2010 -- the original target date was 2005 -- it is not creditable.  
Additional distorting elements are that CENVAT (which is still limited to the manufacturing 
level) is included in the base of the state VAT and that, as noted above, state sales tax and the 
central taxes cannot be credited against each other. As with the Union government‘s VAT, there 
is thus still some distance to go before the reform of state sales taxes is complete. 
 
 Currently, it is planned to adopt by 2010 what would in effect be an integrated VAT 
structure -- called the Goods and Services Tax (GST) -- with both central and state taxes 
covering goods and services, extending to the retail level, and on a fully creditable basis.  
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 This and some of the other observations in this section are based in part on valuable work in progress to which 
Arindam Das-Gupta kindly gave me access: I am of course fully responsible for the use made here of this 
information.   
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However, the rates of the two taxes -- the central GST (CGST) and the state GST (SGST) -- 
would be independent and there would be no crediting between levels of government. The 
adoption of this system, which in some ways resembles the structure of the system existing in the 
Canadian province of Québec -- where independent federal (GST) and provincial (QST) VATs 
operate (Bird and Gendron 1998)
40
 -- would reduce substantially the long-standing economic 
distortions arising from India's system of consumption taxation.  
 
The current plan is thus to adopt a full-fledged GST (VAT) at both levels of government 
in India in 2010, with the central government imposing its CGST and the state governments 
independently imposing their SGSTs on the same base as the CGST (Empowered Committee 
2009).  For this plan to succeed, however, a good deal will first have to happen.  For example, a 
constitutional revision is necessary, for instance, to allow the states to tax services. Excluding 
services from the tax base distorts relative prices, reduces the buoyancy of revenues, and 
probably makes the tax more regressive.  In addition, to achieve the GST another compensatory 
revenue underwriting agreement may be necessary from the central government; a more limited 
compensatory agreement is already envisaged with respect to the planned abolition of the Central 
Sales Tax (the levy on interstate trade mentioned earlier) in 2010.
41
  Moreover, further 
discussions will be needed between the central and state governments to determine rate 
structures, not least since both will be taxing the same tax base.  Finally, while it is clear that 
CGST and SGST will not be creditable against each other, important details remain to be worked 
out – or at least revealed – with respect to the workings of the proposed Integrated GST (IGST) 
which is the intended mechanism for dealing with the difficult creditable issues arising with 
interstate trade (Empowered Committee 2009).
42
  Nonetheless, India has advanced a long and 
impressive way down the difficult path towards a fully reformed VAT system at both central and 
state levels since this task was officially placed on the policy agenda in 1995.   
                                                 
40
 In the Québec case, both taxes – the federal GST and the provincial QST --are operated by the provincial 
government.  However, as Empowered Committee (2009) makes clear, in the Indian case, the state and central taxes 
will be administered separately.  Rao (2008) highlights the many issues that still need to be resolved before India has 
a fully operational ―dual VAT‖ along the envisaged lines.  While Empowered Committee (2009) has answered some 
of the questions raised by Rao (2008), there remain a number of important unresolved issues, notably the tax rates, 
the ‗place of supply‘ rules, and just how the envisaged ‗clearing house‘ system would work (Misrah 2009).  
Although these details cannot be further discussed here, it should be noted that the most complex technical issue is 
perhaps the place of supply rule – a problem that is largely finessed in Canada by the revenue allocation system that 
has been adopted (Bird and Gendron 2009).  It is far from clear whether the same result can be obtained under the 
proposed Indian clearing house system. Similarly, the adoption of the proposed new system appears to depend in 
large part on the ability of the central treasury to provide adequate compensation to states that will lose revenues if 
they remove existing tax distortions.  Given the current fiscal deficit at the center, this problem may well delay the 
intended 2010 implementation date.  Finally, it may also perhaps be worth mentioning that in some ways the 
apparently intended  uniform standard rate in the Indian states is closer to the other Canadian system called the 
harmonized sales tax (HST) under which three provinces have their VATs administered by the central government 
with one proviso being that they impose uniform rates, although there is no technical reason why this is necessary 
(Smart and Bird 2007) and in fact, the province of British Columbia currently intends to join the HST system 2010 
with a different rate.   
41
 As Bird and Gendron (2009) show, Canadian experience suggests that it is not necessary to reach full agreement 
of tax base, provided that any disagreements take place at the retail sales level -- for example, one level (or one 
jurisdiction at any level) taxes retail sales of books and the other does not. 
42
 In some ways, the brief description of the intended mechanism in Empowered Committee (2009) appear similar to 
a system proposed for Brazil some years ago by Varsano (2000), but at the time of writing insufficient information 
is available to enable a full assessment of the proposed system (Misrah 2009). 
  Subnational Taxation in Large Emerging Countries: BRIC Plus One 27 
 
Local Government Finance 
 
 As mentioned earlier, surprisingly little is known about local public finances in India 
particularly in rural areas. Although the Constitution provides for the basic rural local 
government, the gram panchayat, to have the power to tax, state governments not only determine 
which taxes their local governments may levy but also how much autonomy local governments 
with respect to taxation. On the whole, it appears that there has been little revenue 
decentralization to the third tier since the constitutional amendments of the early 1990‘s.  While 
states differ in the revenue sources that they assign to local governments, and (as noted in Table 
9) many local taxes exist, none are really broad-based or produce much revenue, and all are 
hampered by the generally low administrative capacity of rural local governments in particular in 
most of India.   
 
 In West Bengal, for example, both the property tax base and ceiling rate are set by the 
state, although local governments are responsible for keeping the tax rolls and for collecting and 
enforcing the tax.  Although the tax base in West Bengal includes both agricultural and 
nonagricultural property (which is not the case in most states), there is no systematic evaluation 
process and in practice the taxes are often levied on the basis of area or some other notional 
basis.  Moreover, even on what seems to be a very much undervalued base collection appears to 
be at a low level: indeed, one recent study characterized property tax payments to rural local 
governments as essentially "voluntary" since those governments had no effective enforcement 
capability (Bahl et al. 2005). Unsurprisingly, very few revenues are collected and the consensus 
of observers is that the performance of the property tax -- the only potentially important tax in 




 Matters are not much better in urban areas with respect to property taxes.
44
  As a recent 
survey suggested, India could perhaps learn much from Brazil‘s approach to property taxation 
through a combination of field surveys, a highly simplified form of mass appraisal, and use of 
construction cost data in both rural and urban areas (Bahl et al. 2005). Although substantial 
attention should be paid to improving collection efficiency also (Dillinger 1991), the relatively 
high yield of the property tax in Delhi, which traditionally had a better valuation system than 
most Indian cities, suggests that efforts along these directions would be worthwhile.
45
   
  
 Property tax reform is clearly important and desirable in both urban and rural India.  It is 
particularly critical in rural areas where there are essentially no alternative possible sources of 
local "own" revenue.  Of course, reform is also particularly difficult to achieve in those areas 
given the combination of the dominance of the rural elite in many local areas and the 
understandable resistance of all potential taxpayers to increased property taxes in the absence of 
                                                 
43
 For an interesting general discussion of rural local public finances in India, see Datta (2009). Another "local" tax 
is the entertainment tax, levied on admissions to various events.  In West Bengal the rate of this tax is 10% but it is 
collected by the state government, with 80% of the collections being distributed to urban local governments and 
20% to rural local governments.  This is a state transfer, not a local tax. 
44
 See Naresh (2004) and Sridhar, Bandyopadhyay, and Sikdar (2008). 
45
 In this regard, however, see the questions raised by Slack (2006) on the long-term sustainability of two critical 
elements of the major reform in the Delhi property tax 2004 -- self-assessment and the unit area value approach. 
Datta (2008) mentions numerous issues that adversely affecting property tax collections in urban areas such as weak 
valuation and assessment systems and poor collection efficiency.  
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immediate and visible offsetting benefits.  Property tax reform is also desirable in urban areas 
given the importance of rising land values as a source of wealth expanding market economies.  
However, it may be similarly hard to implement given what Datta (2008, 15) calls the ―general 
political resistance to utilize visible taxes at the sub-national level.‖   
 
At present, in most of India‘s cities, particularly the larger cities a much more important 
revenue source is octroi, an archaic local levy on goods entering the city, which a few years ago 
was reported to account for 70% of urban tax revenue in the country as a whole compared to 
only 20% for property taxes (Rao and Singh 2005, 310). Economists as a rule dislike octroi 
(essentially a local import duty) as an inefficient, distortionary tax that is often administered very 
corruptly. Although some states have abolished this tax, in some instances it has been replaced 
with an "entry tax" with similar characteristics, and some states have even introduced octroi 
itself in recent years. In India‘s rapidly growing urban areas there is probably no realistic 
possibility of replacing the share of local revenues that now comes from octroi simply by 
increasing property taxes, no matter how well designed and well implemented.   
 
Unfortunately for economists, it does not appear that their favorite proposal for local 
fiscal reform – a bigger and better property tax -- will be easy to accomplish, let alone to 
implement soon enough and successfully enough to produce sufficient revenues to replace 
octroi.  Given the expected rapid degree of urbanization in India in future years if its 
development continues along its current path, it thus seems likely that Indian cities will need 
another major revenue source if they are to cope with their growth even to the relatively 
unsatisfactory extent that they have managed to do so to date, let alone to accommodate the new 
wealthy, the expanding middle class, and the incoming rural migrants that threaten to inundate 
them both. China, Russia and Brazil already have various forms of local business taxes, however 
imperfect, that help meet such needs.  Perhaps India too will have to consider permitting at least 
larger urban areas to impose such levies if they are to be able to meet the fiscal challenges they 
face now and in the future. 
 
Summing Up  
 
In India, two key problems are how to create adequately "hard" budget constraints at both 
the state and local levels of government and how to establish clearly delineated and properly 
functioning tax systems at both the state and local levels of government. The key to both 
problems is to continue to reform consumption taxes at the central level and correspondingly at 
the state level. With the most recent report of the Empowered Committee (2009), India has set 
out the clear goal of adopting both central and state GSTs in 2010.  However, several important 
steps remain: (1) a constitutional revision to allow services to be taxed under the new GSTs; (2) 
another compensatory revenue underwriting agreement (in addition to that already reached with 
respect to the Central Sales Tax) from the central government, which must also finally abolish 
the CST; (3) and finally, and most importantly, there may still be some distance to go before 
reaching full agreement on how the proposed new ―dual VAT‖ system (the CGST and the 
various SGSTs) will work with respect to interstate trade.  Still, very considerable progress has 
been made with respect to reforming consumption taxes, and the future looks brighter in this 
respect than ever before. Other countries – perhaps especially Brazil – may perhaps learn from 
the Indian example.  
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At the local level, as in most countries property tax reform is clearly important, perhaps 
especially in rural areas where there are essentially no alternative possible sources of local "own" 
revenue.  In urban areas, however, there is probably no realistic possibility of replacing the share 
of local revenues that now comes from octroi simply by increasing property taxes, no matter how 
well designed and well implemented. Indian cities almost certainly need another major revenue 
source if they are to cope with their growth.  India may thus have something to learn from Brazil 
and other countries on how urban areas may be able to better meet the fiscal challenges they face 
now and in the future in part by imposing some form of local business taxation – although, as 
always, great care is necessary to avoid encouraging undesirable forms of local tax competition. 
 
 




Subnational taxes are important in China.  Indeed, from a statistical perspective it appears 
at first glance (see Table 1) that subnational governments in China are both more important 
taxers and more heavily reliant on ‗own revenues‘ than those in most countries.  Unsurprisingly, 
subnational taxes are therefore critical to China‘s future in many ways, for example, with respect 
to the regional and rural-urban distribution of income and wealth and the delivery of such basic 
services as education and health.  Indeed in many ways, as Wong and Bird (2008) argue at 
length, the key not only to China‘s public finance system but also its political stability may lie in 
getting subnational taxes and the other critical components of its intergovernmental fiscal system 
right.   
 
Despite all the revenue they seem to control, however, some serious problems have 
emerged in the finances of many of China's subnational governments in recent decades – 
problems that are distorting resource allocation and increasing distributional tensions and that 
may over time slow down the impressive growth rate of the Chinese economy.
47
  Although the 
fundamental problem is the inappropriate assignment of revenues, and more fundamentally of 
expenditures, to the subnational level, this problem is exacerbated by the lack of any real control 
by subnational governments over the formal taxes whose revenues flow to them.  
 
China‘s fiscal development illustrates clearly the importance of ‗path dependency.‘  How 
a country‘s institutions develop depends critically upon where they start. To understand either 
the present or the future of China‘s fiscal system, one must understand that it emerged from a 
system that had been installed in the 1950s, largely reflecting then-current Soviet practice. Under 
that system, essentially all expenditures were determined at the center. However, responsibilities 
for day-to-day public administration and social services such as education (except universities), 
public safety, health care, social security, housing, and other local/urban services were all 
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 This section draws heavily on the more detailed discussion in Wong and Bird (2008).  I am heavily indebted to 
Christine Wong for much help in understanding China‘s complex public finances, although I am of course solely 
responsible for what is said here.   
47
 For analyses of local government financial problems, see World Bank (2002) and Wong (2007).  World Bank 
(2002) argues that local government financial problems had, by the late 1990s, become an obstacle to 
implementation of the national development agenda on health and education.  Wong (2007) emphasizes the adverse 
distributional consequences of the present intergovernmental fiscal system. 
30 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
delegated to several layers of subnational government -- provinces, counties, and townships as 
well as, less formally, village associations.  Financing for these services was provided by the 
central government through the revenue-sharing system, under which all revenues-- which came 
largely from industrial profits and were collected in a highly uneven pattern from different 
regions and localities -- belonged to the central government.  In principle, sharing rates were set 
annually at levels leaving each local government sufficient resources to finance its (centrally) 
approved expenditures. In practice, however, the revenue-sharing system was largely negotiated 
in nature. 
 
As the mechanisms of the planned economy – administrative prices, compulsory 
procurement and planned delivery, monopoly state ownership of industry – began to be 
dismantled, China‘s formal revenue system quickly began to erode. The immediate impact of 
market reform was dramatic erosion of the tax base as state enterprise profits and hence revenue 
collection declined steeply.  Central revenues were especially hard-hit because local 
governments in rich regions often shielded local enterprises from taxation to avoid sharing 
revenues with central government.
48 
  The Chinese tax system rested on the local collection of 
revenues that were then remitted to the center. This administrative structure proved vulnerable to 
erosion as central economic control lessened. Unfortunately, since this fundamental problem was 
not initially understood, the immediate response to the perceived revenue problem was a series 
of changes in tax structure and revenue sharing arrangements (Wong 1992, 1993).  For example, 
an income tax on state-owned enterprises introduced in 1984 to replace profit remittances was 
quickly replaced in 1986 by a ‗contract‘ system, under which enterprises signed multi-year 
contracts specifying their profit remittances.   
 
Fiscal revenues continued to decline, however, in part because the central government 
was unable to monitor what was going on at the provincial level.  In 1988 the central government 
therefore introduced a further system of fiscal contracts with subnational governments. These 
contracts stipulated a lump-sum remittance to the center from each province, to increase annually 
by an agreed rate with any excess revenues accruing to the province.  In return, provinces 
accepted responsibility for meeting their expenditure requirements from retained revenues.  By 
de-linking revenue-sharing from expenditure needs, this system in effect for the first time put 
local governments on a self-financing basis – a de facto devolution of responsibilities later 
codified in the 1994 Budget Law. 
 
The new system did not, however, solve the central government‘s financial problems.  
Revenues continued to decline. Indeed, because the contracts gave subnational governments a 
disproportionate share of new revenues, the central share of revenues fell even more sharply to 
the startling figure of only 3 percent of GDP in 1993. As discussed below, however, this decline 
in revenues was in a way largely an illusion owing to the rapid growth of ‗extrabudgetary 
revenues‘ throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  Nonetheless, since most of these revenues accrued 
primarily to subnational governments their expansion did little to offset the erosion of allocative 
control by the central government.  All this was changed in 1994 by a drastic reform that 
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 For example, under the planned economy Shanghai remitted more than 80 percent of its revenues to the central 
government.  This high ‗tax‘ on Shanghai revenues created incentives for collusion between the municipal 
government and its subordinate enterprises to realize the potential for informally sharing the ―saved revenues‖ 
within Shanghai.  See Oksenberg and Tong (1991) and Wong (1991, 1992).  
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recentralized the fiscal system with two paramount objectives– stemming the decline of revenues 
and clawing back a majority share for the central government. 
 
 
The 1994 Reform 
 
The 1994 reform drastically changed China's tax structure, notably by introducing a VAT 
to replace the previous complex system of turnover taxes. It also fundamentally changed the way 
revenues were shared between the central and provincial governments by shifting from a 
negotiated system of general revenue sharing to a mix of tax assignments and tax sharing.
  
Under 
the new system, all taxes are either specifically assigned to central or subnational government, or 
shared (Table 8).  Despite the length of the list in Table 8, only three taxes really matter much: 
the VAT, the enterprise income tax (EIT) and excises. Since the VAT accounts for over half of 
all tax revenues in China and 75% of VAT proceeds go to the central government, the reform 
greatly strengthened central government revenues. By reducing local ‗ownership‘ of turnover 
taxes, the reform significantly diluted the linkage between enterprises and local revenues.  
However, in order to maintain incentives for promoting local industry the second largest tax in 
revenue terms, the enterprise income tax (EIT), continues to be divided by ownership (or 
subordination) with central enterprises paying EIT to the central government, provincial 
enterprises to the provincial government, and so on.  
 
An additional important element of the 1994 reform was that it established a national tax 
administration in China for the first time.  The previous local tax bureaus were split into two 
distinct offices: a national tax administration responsible for collecting central and shared taxes 
(the VAT, excises and customs duties, as well as the EIT from central enterprises), and a local 
tax administration responsible for collecting local taxes. By removing central taxes and the VAT 
from local administration, the reform largely eliminated opportunities for local governments to 
divert central revenues into local coffers through manipulations of tax assessments. The result 
was that central revenue (not just tax) collections rebounded from only 11 percent of GDP in 
1996 to levels closer to 20 percent by the end of the decade.  
 
One important outcome of this reform for subnational governments was the creation of a 
new business tax on services (see also the discussion in section 2 above of the ISS in Brazil) and 
its assignment to local governments.  This tax now rivals in importance the share that local 
governments receive from VAT revenues. The local shares of both VAT and EIT are calculated 
on a derivation basis (where taxes are collected, such as the headquarters of enterprises).  One 
outcome of this system was that an increasing number of complaints have been voiced about ―tax 
competition‖ -- local governments luring enterprises to move their headquarters with offers to 
‗rebate‘ a portion of their tax payments.49 
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 As mentioned in Section 3 above, similar complaints were also common in Russia (Shatalov 2006). 
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Table 3 
Tax Assignment in China 
 
I. Taxes exclusively assigned to the Central Government  
1. Excise taxes 
2. Taxes collected from the Ministry of Railroads and from the headquarters of banks and insurance 
companies 
3. Income taxes, sales taxes and royalties from offshore oil activities of foreign companies and joint 
ventures 
4. Energy and transportation fund contribution 
5. Seventy percent of the three sales taxes collected from enterprises owned by the Ministry of 
Industry, the Ministry of Power, SINOPEC (petrochemicals), and the China nonferrous metals 
companies. 
6. All customs duty, VAT and excise taxes on imports 
7. Enterprise income tax collected from banks and other financial institutions. 
 
II. Taxes shared between the central and local governments 
1. Value-added tax (75 percent central, 25 percent provincial) 
2. Natural resource taxes (coal, gas, oil, and other minerals if the enterprises are fully Chinese 
owned.) 
3. Construction tax on the cost of construction of buildings that are outside the plan and financed 
from retained earnings 
4. Salt tax 
5. Industrial and commercial tax, and income tax levied on foreign and joint venture enterprises. 
6. Security and exchange tax (50 percent central, 50 percent provincial) – added in late 1990s 
7. Income tax of all enterprises – added in 2002 
8. Personal income taxes – added in 2002. 
 
III. Taxes exclusively assigned to local governments 
1. Business (gross receipts) tax falling on sectors not covered by VAT (transportation and 
communications, construction, finance and insurance, post and telecommunications, culture and 
sports, entertainment, hotels and restaurants, and other) 
2. Rural market (stall rental) trading tax 
3. The urban maintenance and construction tax (a surcharge on the tax liability of enterprises for 
business tax, consumption tax, and VAT) 
4. The urban land use tax 
5. Vehicle and vessel utilization tax 
6. Thirty percent of the product and VAT revenues collected from enterprises owned by the 
Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Power, SINOPEC, and the China nonferrous metals companies 
7. Value-added tax on land 
8.  Education surtax 
9. Entertainment and slaughter taxes  
10. Property tax 
11. Surtax on collective enterprises  
12. Resources tax 
13. Fixed asset investment tax (discontinued in 1999) 
14. Fines for delinquent taxes.  
 
Source: Wong and Bird (2008).
  Subnational Taxation in Large Emerging Countries: BRIC Plus One 33 
 
Another result of the new system was that revenue-rich regions kept more.  In 
particular, the richer and more rapidly growing coastal provinces gained revenue shares 
relative to inland provinces.  However, because expenditure assignments were left 
unchanged, subnational governments as a whole continued to be faced with a huge fiscal 
gap. The outcome was that, unlike the previous regime under which only poor provinces 
received transfers, all provinces (including Shanghai and Beijing) are now dependent on 
central transfers to finance expenditures.  In aggregate, provinces are now dependent on 





Through a combination of monetary and financial policy and continued political 
control from the centre, China has managed to overcome the macroeconomic problems 
that might have arisen from this fiscal imbalance.  Nonetheless, the mismatch of 
expenditures and revenues between levels of government resulting from the 1994 reform 
has led to various problems as different layers of government have struggled to find their 
fiscal feet in this fundamentally distorted structure.  In particular, many subnational 
governments have attempted to cope with their increasing fiscal problems by increasing 
revenues in a variety of legal, quasi-legal, and even illegal ways.  
 
   Despite the resulting relatively chaotic operation of the overwhelmingly important 
subnational government sector, to date Chinese officials and entrepreneurs have in 
aggregate obviously been able to cope. However, in many cases they have done so by 
means that create further problems. In particular, much of the recent fiscal story at the 
subnational level has taken place outside the formal budget system.  In addition to the 
rapid growth of extrabudgetary funds mentioned earlier a host of implicit and hidden 
revenues, transfers, and expenditures pervade the system, driven in part by the lack of 
any good formal local tax bases and facilitated by the continuing obscurity of the line 
between ‗government‘ and ‗business‘ in China, especially at the local level. 
 
Allowing local governments to tap off-budget revenues was initially seen as a 
stop-gap measure to enable them to secure sufficient finance to carry out their assigned 
functions.  In 1996 a nationwide audit found that ‗extra-budgetary funds‘ (EBF) were 
about 50 percent more than the reported figures and equal to 6 percent of GDP.  Since 
budgetary revenues were only 11.3 percent of GDP that year, this amounted to more than 
half of budget revenues and more than one-third of resources available to government.   
By 1998, EBF had become even more important, with estimates of 15 percent or more 
being cited by official sources.
50   
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 This number was widely cited in the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) newspaper, zhongguo 
shuiwubao, and attributed to the highest officials of SAT, including its deputy chief as well as chief 
economist. The numbers are rough because reporting requirements are much looser for EBF than for 
budgetary resources, because of differing and changing definitions of what is ‗extrabudgetary‘, and because 
recipients of EBF have no incentive to disclose fully the extent of their receipts. A broad definition is that 
EBF constitute all resources managed directly or indirectly by administrative branches of the government 
outside the normal budgetary process.  The term ‗extrabudgetary funds‘ is, however, generally used in 
China in a narrower sense than this to refer primarily to fees and funds that are not taxes or budgetary items 
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A new fiscal reform was launched in 1998 to ―convert fees into taxes‖ 
(feigaishui).   This target seemed appropriate because luanshoufei (the reckless collection 
of fees) had become the bane of businesses and citizens alike.  This practice created a 
serious problem for the central government because it eroded tax capacity and subverted 
the whole budgeting process, thereby impeding the government‘s ability to carry out its 
own core fiscal functions (macro management, equalization, and resource allocation).   
 
Although certainly not unknown at times in other transitional countries,
51
 China 
represents an extreme case of dependency on extrabudgetary finance, especially at the 
subnational level.  Subnational governments are responsible in China for providing 
significant expenditures, including social safety nets (pensions, unemployment insurance, 
disability, minimum income support, etc.) and capital investment (especially the need to 
replace or refurbish obsolete and poorly maintained infrastructure).  However, they can 
neither set tax rates nor change the bases of collection nor introduce new taxes. On the 
other hand, they often control substantial assets such as land, enterprises, and sometimes 
natural resources.  
 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that subnational governments have 
responded to fiscal pressures in a variety of ways.  For example, they have accumulated 
arrears -- wage arrears to teachers, medical workers, and civil servants as well as payment 
arrears (pensions, unemployment insurance, and debt to suppliers such as utilities). 
Moreover, although there is no firm statistical evidence on this phenomenon, many 
subnational governments are reported to have borrowed (usually illegally) from state 
enterprises, pension funds, unemployment insurance funds, and banks. Most importantly, 
however, they have focused their efforts on developing EBF.  Virtually all levels of 
government in China – down to municipal districts and even villages (which do not 
constitute a formal level of government – have the capacity to exact payments under 
various names from local businesses and residents. It is not surprising that most 
subnational governments seem to have done so. 
 
Since there is no effective system of monitoring and control (either by higher 
level governments or by an electorate), the extensive decentralized "taxing power" that 
has been exercised through the EBF mechanism is obviously prone to abuse.  The 
Chinese press cites many instances of excessive spending by local governments -- 
construction of a huge international airport across the border from Hong Kong in Zhuhai, 
the tens of thousands of ―development zones‖, ―tourism spots‖ and luxury hotels, and, 
increasingly in the 21
st
 Century, elaborate plazas and city center shopping malls.  Even in 
poor localities there is a good deal of lavish public spending on banquets and karaoke 
bars, etc. One result has been worsening popular perceptions of governments at all levels 
that seem to be abusing their power by imposing fees and levies to enrich themselves.  
                                                                                                                                                 
but that are nonetheless specifically authorized by some government body.  This definition leaves out 
significant public resources -- such as the sale of land leases -- that are neither budgetary nor 
extrabudgetary in this sense.  Such funds are variously called self-raised funds, extra-extrabudgetary funds, 
off-budgetary funds, or extra-system revenues. 
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 See, for instance, the discussion of similar problems in Russia in World Bank (1996). 
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Further reforms in 2002 attempted to bring extra-budgetary revenues under better central 
budgetary control but the problem persists in many areas.   
 
Although EBF have provided considerable and arguably desirable autonomy to 
local governments, they have also added considerably to the obscurity and probably also 
the regressivity of the general public finance scene in China. No one really knows what is 
going on within the bowels of China‘s complex and opaque fiscal system.52 No news is 
not necessarily good news.  In fact, it is decidedly bad news from the perspective of 
building a more transparent public sector to support China‘s continuing drive to 
modernization. 
 
China is in some ways one of the most fiscally decentralized countries in the 
world.  Unfortunately, the coherence of the intergovernmental fiscal system in China has 
been steadily chipped away by piecemeal incremental changes over the years, largely in 
reaction to perceived problems as they surfaced.  Many problems at the top of the 
national agenda originate to a considerable extent from problems with the 
intergovernmental fiscal system – e.g. pension and civil servant wage arrears, arrears or 
defaults on living stipend support for laid-off workers and problems in financing rural 
basic education, and civil service wage arrears.  Ultimately, many of these problems arise 
in part because of the difficulties local governments face in performing their assigned 
responsibilities.   
 
 
The Basic Problem 
 
At base, the problem is that subnational governments in China have unsustainable 
expenditure assignments.  Social security and pensions are the responsibility of cities and 
counties.  Until 2001, education and health care were also primarily the responsibilities of 
city districts and townships.  Unfortunately, such major and growing expenditure 
responsibilities are supported neither by adequate revenue assignments devolving real 
responsibility on subnational governments nor by an effective system of transfers.  Many 
local governments are simply unable to perform their assigned functions.  Nor is any 
supporting system in place to ensure minimum standards of service provision across 
regions and localities.  As economic growth became more concentrated in coastal regions 
during the 1990s, for example, income disparities accelerated (Wong 2007).  The 
outcome was a sharp rise in interregional disparities in fiscal spending and in particular a 
gradual deterioration in public services provided in the inland provinces. With local 
funding problems limiting services the national government has also been unable to 
deliver on schedule such priority programs such as universal basic education.  In 2005, 
for example, China was still some distance away from providing the nine years of free 
education to all children originally targeted for the year 2000.  
  
                                                 
52
 For instance, there is considerable confusion about the real size and nature of the important ‗public sector 
units‘ (PSUs) -- schools, hospitals, transport systems – that actually provide services.  There is no central 
data source on the operation and finances of the ‗public sector‘ broadly defined: different data are collected 
by different ministries for different purposes, and most such data are not publicly available in any case.  
36 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
As part of a reform to the intergovernmental transfer system in 2002 the income 
tax was shifted from a local tax to a shared tax, with the central government putting any 
additional revenues it received as a result of this change in excess of the amount that it 
previously received (20%) into a special equalization transfer fund. Nonetheless, central 
government bail-outs of subnational governments have continued to increase in response 
to emerging problems in pension arrears, financing rural basic education, and the like.  
What subnational governments have probably learned over time is that the Ministry of 
Finance will intervene whenever necessary to preserve social stability and will in 
particular go to great lengths to prevent wage arrears from getting out of hand.  One 
result is that even though civil service wages -- set by the central government -- have 
more than doubled since 1999, government employees have become almost ‗free goods‘ 
to local governments.
53
  The perverse result is that many local governments added staff 
during a period in which a draconian program was being implemented at the central 
government level to downsize the civil service.   
 
Like the misallocation of revenue, the murkiness of expenditure assignments has 
damaged accountability.  When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible. In the 
difficult fiscal circumstances of recent years, as each level of government has 
increasingly tried to capture revenues by redefining the ‗sharing‘ of revenues in its own 
favor as much as possible, many problems cascaded down to the lowest (and least 
influential) levels. For example, despite increases in staff financed largely by increased 
transfers some rural counties in recent years have had little or no revenue to pay for other 
recurrent expenses in activities ranging from schools to agricultural stations.  Increased 
transfers often resulted in more local government employees -- but not necessarily in 




Even major reforms intended to improve the well-being of those at the bottom of 
the system have had perverse effects. For example, the Rural Fee Reform (RFR) rolled 
out since 2002 for nationwide implementation in three phases was intended to reduce the 
overall burden of taxes and fees in the rural sector and to end unreasonable levies by 
township and village officials.  At one stroke, this reform eliminated all fees levied by 
township governments and village associations. Almost simultaneously, the long-
standing agricultural tax was also abolished to improve rural well-being, The net result of 
these changes is that China‘s grassroots governments are now even more dependent on 
transfers than before (Bird et al. 2009). 
 
In short, as yet China has not managed to resolve such critical aspects of 
intergovernmental finance as expenditure and revenue assignment and the design and 
implementation of a sound transfer system. Continuing party dominance dampens some 
of the possible problems that might otherwise have emerged, but the underlying situation 
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 Despite China‘s decentralization in many respects, both administrative appointments and political 
accountability remain highly centralized.  One result is that local governments in poorer areas have been 
doubly penalized: on one hand, they have few resources of their own; on the other, they are often further 
penalized for being unable to respond adequately to central policy initiatives (Liu and Tao 2007). 
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 For a more detailed look at the resulting problems in public service provision in rural areas, see Bird et 
al. (2009). 
  Subnational Taxation in Large Emerging Countries: BRIC Plus One 37 
 
has not been improved. China may perhaps be nearing the end of its repeated ad hoc and 
piecemeal attempts to avert imminent fiscal calamity in one or another part of the public 
sector.   
 
One essential ingredient in the next big reform of the public finance system may 
have to be turning over more direct responsibility and better instruments for raising 
revenues to China‘s big cities (Bird 2005a) and indeed to subnational governments in 
general.  Those governments already have access to far more revenues than their 
counterparts in most countries.  However, they also have even more expenditure 
responsibilities and extremely limited ability to alter revenue outcomes.  In both the 
largest urban and the smallest rural areas, the fiscal decentralization literature 
summarized in Bird (2010) suggests that giving some greater degree of revenue 
autonomy to subnational governments may be an essential element in the development 
and improvement of efficient and effective public service delivery by these governments.  
On the other hand, increased decentralization of taxing authority in the absence of more 
explicit and adequate local accountability mechanisms may result in even more 
corruption, inefficiency, and distortions than the present system.  Fiscal decentralization 
in China may thus continue to generate increasing problems in a number of related areas 
unless it is accompanied by more profound changes in political decentralization.  
 
Summing Up   
 
In China, subnational governments already have access to far more revenues than 
their counterparts in other countries.  They also have more expenditure responsibilities 
and little ability to expand their revenues in non-distorting ways. Both sides of this 
budgetary dilemma demand attention.  Although neither of these subjects has been 
discussed in detail here, probably more expenditure responsibilities should be shifted to 
the central government and a better and probably more equalizing transfer system 
introduced.  At the same time subnational governments might be given at least limited 
freedom to alter tax rates -- for example, property tax rates and perhaps also to impose 
provincial surcharges on some central excises and perhaps even personal income taxes.  
Although more caution is needed in allowing subnational governments free access to 
taxes like VAT and EIT that may result in wasteful tax competition, as Bird (2010) 
discusses, it may also be possible to eliminate this danger while permitting subnational 
governments to tap these major revenue sources more responsibly and accountably. 
Experience elsewhere suggests that giving more revenue freedom to some extent to 
subnational governments may be an essential element in the development and 
improvement of efficient and effective public service delivery by these governments.  On 
the other hand, even well designed increased decentralization of taxing authority may be 
dangerous unless accompanied by more effective political decentralization to ensure 
better local accountability. It remains far from clear how or to what extent local fiscal 
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6. Subnational Taxation in Nigeria 
 
Nigeria is rich in natural resources and in particular in oil and gas.  The oil 
sector‘s contribution to GDP is over 50 per cent; it accounts for more than 70 per cent of 
the government revenues and over 85 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.  The recent 
increases in oil prices have resulted both in unprecedented buoyancy in revenues and 
unparalleled dependence on the oil sector. Nigeria is also, unfortunately, one of the 
clearest cases of what Collier (2007) calls "the natural resource trap": conflict over its 
natural resources resulted first in a vicious civil war in the 1960s, subsequently led to a 
series of military governments, and still today lies behind substantial regional unrest as 
well as corruption of the political process as different groups contend for control over 
larger shares of the flow of "free" resources flowing into the hands of the state.
55
 Neither 
autocratic nor democratic rule has so far appeared to work out well in terms of growth, 





As Collier (2007, 46) points out, one reason big resource revenues weaken 
political restraints and often result in such bad outcomes is "because resource rich 
countries do not need to tax, they do not provoke citizens into supplying the public good 
of scrutiny over how their taxes are being spent."  They do not do so, of course, because 
it is not really their taxes that are being spent. When no one feels they are paying, no one 
worries about accountability.  However, without accountability citizens have no way to 
ensure that politicians and officials are responsive to their needs and not just acting in 
their own self-interest. 
 
  Nonetheless, despite obvious problems over the years, Nigeria has made 
considerable progress in some respects such as macroeconomic stabilization.  Recent 
governments have also made some attempts to strengthen the systems and institutions of 
accountability, for example, by introducing budgeting at the federal level based on the 
reference price of oil to reduce the volatility of expenditures. Particularly important in 
some respects is the increased role of subnational governments which now control over 
50 per cent of public funds, with the states in particular being primarily responsible for 
delivering core public services and having considerable autonomy in how they do so.  
Few states, however, have either efficient or effective public administration structures in 
place to do these good things even if they wanted to do so. 
 
Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, has been a federal state ever since it 
achieved independence in 1960, and indeed was run in a "federal" way even before then.  
Over the turbulent years since its independence -- years that have seen three constitutions, 
four republics and several military dictatorships -- the number of states has increased 
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 Asaduriam et al. (2006, 407) note that "there have been over 100 ethnic-religious conflicts and numerous 
other types of conflicts since 1960." 
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 Like democracy, decentralization in conflict-ridden societies like Nigeria can cut both ways to exacerbate 
or to ameliorate the problem problems of heterogeneous societies, depending on the precise nature of the 
problem and the precise nature of the decentralization initiative in question: see the interesting, if far from 
conclusive, case study in Diprose and Ukiwo (2008). 
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from the initial three to the present 36 (plus a capital territory).  Federalism thus appears 
not only to exist in Nigeria in constitutional law but in fact.  Nonetheless, Asadurian et al. 
(2006, 47) correctly say that "Nigeria's recent history has also been characterized by 
extremely centralized political and economic power."
57
 While Nigeria's experience may 
appear to be a better example for critics of decentralization and federalism than for those 
who advocate such policies as ways to improve governance, these authors argue that it is 
not a fiscally federal state in any meaningful sense.  Indeed, as another observer (Ibrahim 
2001, 486) put it: "... the recent history of Nigeria is one of fiscal unitarianism rather than 
fiscal federalism... fiscal federalism requires effective decentralization of resources, of 
revenue and spending powers among the different tiers of government so that there is no 
excess of fiscal dependence of one level on the other.  We do not have that situation in 
Nigeria."   
 
 
Natural Resource Revenues 
 
Most government revenue in Nigeria at all levels comes from oil and the federal 
government basically controls oil revenues although the precise nature and extent of its 
control has changed over time depending on the balance of political forces in the country.  
As Collier (2007)'s analysis would suggest, the political history of Nigeria since 
independence is, unsurprisingly, inextricably intertwined with the history of struggles 
over allocating revenue.  Under the existing (1999) Constitution, direct taxes on income 
and profits are exclusively federal as are import and export duties, excises and the value-
added tax.   Since colonial times revenue sharing has been a central feature of Nigerian 
federalism.  As Table 9 shows, most federal tax revenues are in principle shared with 
other levels of government to some extent, including the all-important oil revenues. In 
reality, however, the federal government has almost complete control over the allocation 
of all revenues between the federal, states, and local governments.  States and local 
governments have neither well-defined jurisdictions nor significant autonomy.   
 
As in most federal countries, most broad based taxes are levied and collected by 
the federal government in Nigeria, with most revenue coming from oil.  As the political 
times have changed the extent to which revenues are shared on the basis of derivation 
(origin) as opposed to other more redistributive criteria has varied substantially over 
time.
58
  At present, for example, 13% of oil revenue is distributed to states based on 
origin.  The Federation Account -- see Table 9 -- was initially (in 1999) allocated 56% to 
the federal government (including the Federal capital territory and some special funds), 
24% to state governments and 20% to local governments.
59
  Over the next five years, the 
formula changed slightly to increase the share going to the states to 26.7% and to local 
governments to 20.6% with a correspondingly reduced share going to the federal 
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 For a somewhat more positive view of recent intergovernmental relations in Nigeria, see Alm and Boex 
(2002).   
58
 A detailed catalog of the changes in revenue allocation formulas since 1947 is set out in Asadurian et al. 
(2006); see also the discussion in Ekpo (2004). 
59
 As in Brazil, local governments receive their shares directly from the federal government; the funds do 
not pass through the states. 
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government to 52.7% (Epko 2004). More important than such details, however, is the fact 
that over time a smaller and smaller proportion of total federally collected revenue has 
flowed through this account. Before 1990, about 96% of all revenue was distributed 
through this mechanism; since the late 1990s, however, less than a third of revenue has 
flowed through the Federation Account.  
Table 9 
























 State government 
Betting taxes 
Motor vehicle licenses 
Entertainment tax 





Notes:  (a) These revenues flow to the Federation Account and are shared. 
 (b) States have the right to revenue from the personal income tax except for taxes imposed on 
nonresidents, residents of the Federal capital territory, the armed forces and police which proved the federal 
government. 
 (c) Capital transfer tax is administered by the state which also receives the revenue, while the 
administration and collection of stamp duties is allocated to both federal and state governments although all 
the revenues flow to local governments. 
 (d) Capital gains tax revenues are supposed to go to the states. 
 (e) These taxes are to be administered and collected by the local governments should also receive 
the revenue from them. 
Source: Asadurian, Nnadozie, and Wantchekon (2006) 
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Alm and Boex (2002), for example, report that states received 24% of the 
Federation Account plus 50% of federal VAT revenue (with another 35% of VAT 
revenue going to local governments).  As noted earlier 13% of oil revenues were 
distributed on a derivation basis, with the balance of the fund being distributed 40% in 
equal shares (i.e. each state gets 1/36), 30% based on population, 10% on land area and 
terrain, 10% on various "social development factors" such as school enrollment in 
hospital beds, and the final 10% on the basis of a measure of internal revenue effort. 
Their regression analysis suggested that almost two-thirds of the observed actual 
allocation of funds among states could be explained by population alone and that neither 
fiscal capacity nor fiscal effort had any significant effect.  
 
Unfortunately, states have no other major income source than these revenue 
shares.  Although in principle they have the power to collect personal income tax, the 
actual power to impose such a tax remains with the federal government.  Few if any 
states that would likely be capable of administering this tax in any depth in any case. On 
average in the early 1990s over 80% of state revenue came from federal transfers, 
ranging from 74% in the Southwest region of the country to 95% in the Northeast region 
(Asadurian et al. 2006). Alm and Boex (2002) estimate that in 1999, 61% of state current 
revenue came from the Federation Account with another 14% from VAT sharing.  The 
almost complete dependence on state budgets on fluctuating and volatile oil revenues 
both makes financial management difficult and recourse to other taxes unnecessary.  
Since the revenue also arrives with very few checks and controls on what happens to it 
once states get their hands on it, it is not a surprise that Nigeria's significant natural 






Summing Up   
 
The central fact in Nigeria is that the federal government has almost complete 
control over the allocation of all revenues between the federal, states, and local 
governments.  States and local governments have little taxing power and almost no 
incentive to administer such taxes as the personal income tax or property tax, even if they 
had the capacity to do so. State (and local) budgets depend almost entirely on oil 
revenues send down from the centre.  The inherently undependable nature of this 
intergovernmental fiscal structure makes financial management difficult and acts as a 
strong discouragement to subnational tax efforts. Moreover, as and when central transfers 
arrive, there is little accountability to anyone for how the funds are disbursed, Nigeria 
appears to offer one of the clearest examples available of how abundant ―easy‖ oil money 
can lead to corruption and waste and result in little noticeable improvement in public 
service delivery to the country‘s rapidly growing population. Restoring Nigeria‘s 
intergovernmental fiscal system to health seems likely to be a long-term a process that 
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 Although, as noted by Alm and Boex (2002, 12) fiscal data on local governments in Nigeria are "dated, 
incomplete, and inconsistent," it appears that most or all of the fiscal and accountability problems visible at 
the state level in Nigeria are replicated in its 774 local governments: see Epko and Ndebbio (1998) and 
Akindele et al. (2002). 
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will definitely have to begin at the top.  Moreover, in all likelihood substantial efforts will 
be required to implement an adequate system of public finance management at all levels 





The five countries discussed in this report are very different.  Despite their fiscal 
decentralization, China and Russia are basically politically centralized.  This reality raises 
a major question, since as Bird (2010) argues, although some current subnational tax 
problems could undoubtedly be fixed in both these countries, it is not clear that a sound 
and sustainable system of subnational taxation can be established without somewhat 
more direct and effective political accountability to local people.  On the other hand, 
India and Brazil are in principle and to a considerable extent in practice already both 
politically and fiscally decentralized.  Both countries have already taken considerable 
steps towards creating better subnational tax systems and in many ways seem to be on the 
right path at the regional level, although both perhaps need to think more carefully about 
local government finance.  Finally, Nigeria is unique in this group with respect both to 
the extent of its dependence on natural resource revenues and the relatively undeveloped 
nature of its subnational fiscal system. Of course, these two features are closely related, 
and until major changes take place in how the central government deals with its oil 
income, it seems unlikely that much can or will be done to improve subnational taxation.  
 
Despite their marked differences, all five countries considered here share some 
problems in common: 
 
 First, and importantly, the present assignment of taxes to their important 
subnational levels of government falls short of any reasonable ideal – as set out, 
for example, in Bird (2010)    
 
 Second, in part for this reason there is significant vertical imbalance between 
expenditures and revenues, with consequent implications for autonomy, 
efficiency, and accountability.  If subnational governments are to be big spenders, 
they must, in the interests of fiscal responsibility and accountability, become 
bigger taxers in most countries. Similarly, if such governments are to be efficient 
spenders, their spending must either be completely controlled by higher-level 
governments or they must be made accountable in a significant way to the local 
residents that they are supposed to be serving.  Finally, if large regional 
governments are to be autonomous in any meaningful sense -- as is presumably 
the aim at least in such democratic federal countries as India and Brazil -- they 
should have both the right and the responsibility to raise their own revenues to the 
extent and in the manner that it is appropriate for them to do so.  Some 
suggestions along these lines were noted earlier for each country covered here; a 
more comprehensive review of the character of a good subnational tax system 
may again be found in Bird (2010). 
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 Finally, even if political factors prevent moving to any kind of ‗ideal‘ subnational 
tax structure, the present confused and confusing system of subnational taxation 
found in all the countries examined here results in significant costs — costs of 
administration, costs of compliance, and not least costs arising from tax-induced 
inefficiencies in the allocation of scarce resources. These costs can and should be 
significantly reduced.  Again, some suggestions along these lines are set out in 
Bird (2010).  
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